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Navigation Through Three Straits in the Middle East: Effects
on the United States of Being a Nonparty to the 1982
Convention on the Law of the Sea
by Ronnie Ann Wainwright*
I. THE LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCES
Then Israel sent messengers to Sihon, King of the Amorites, saying,
"Let me pass ... ; we will go by the King's highway until we have
passed through your territory."
Numbers 21:21-22 (R.S.V.)
A s this verse from the Old Testament indicates, even thousands of years
ago passage through sovereign territory was a problem. When the
King of the Amorites refused to grant the Israelites innocent passage
through his territory, they fought their way through.
Hugo Grotius described a parallel between the land and the sea, and
suggested that not only the ancient Hebrews and Greeks, but all peoples
have a customary right of passage through territory which is otherwise
sovereign. Grotius, a seventeenth century Dutch lawyer who is often re-
ferred to as the father of the Law of the Sea, stated: "[B]y the law of
Nations, navigation is free to all persons. . . . Every nation is free to
travel to every other nation and to trade with it."'
Three United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea have been
held in order to determine the issues of freedom and accessibility of the
oceans and world's waterways. The First Conference, held in Geneva in
1958, produced a Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone (the 1958 Convention).2 This Convention came into force on Sep-
tember 10, 1964 after it was ratified by the requisite twenty-two states.
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I H. GROTIUs, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAs 7 (R. Magoffin trans. 1916).
2 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 13/L. 52 [hereinafter cited as 1958 Convention].
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Among other things, it codified the right of innocent passage through
territorial seas, which is a well-established principle of customary inter-
national law.' Included in the regime of innocent passage is the right of
nonsuspendable innocent passage through international straits.4 The
First Conference treated other sea-related issues as well, but came to no
agreement on the maximum limits of the territorial seas. It also left am-
biguous the concept of "innocence," although "innocent passage, as an
internationally accepted principle and right, was never really an issue at
the 1958 . . . conference." '
A Second Conference on the Law of the Sea convened in 1960 to
find an agreeable limit to a state's territorial seas. Unfortunately, the
Second Conference was also unsuccessful in determining a territorial sea
limit. The Second Conference did not deal with the regime of innocent
passage since this had already been codified in the 1958 Convention.
Both Conferences were unsuccessful in reaching agreement about territo-
rial sea limits because by increasing such limits, questions of sovereignty
over living resources had to be resolved. The members of the conferences
were unable to resolve such issues.6
After the breakdown of the Second Conference, technological devel-
opments from increased use of the seas exacerbated old issues and cre-
ated new ones. States began imposing laws primarily in response to
congestion in straits and increased pollution from ships. There was
serious danger that if present trends continue[d] unchecked the greater
part of ocean space would soon be covered by sometimes conflicting
national claims . . . . [T]he fragmentation of ocean space between
more than a hundred different sovereignties with sharply differing poli-
cies and capabilities would significantly hamper vital transnational
uses of the sea such as overflight, military and civilian navigation and
scientific research.7
3 Professor L. Gross states that "the debates at the [1958 Convention] would seem to give
substance to the view that the rule [of innocent passage] was part of international law." Gross, The
Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Right of Innocent Passage Through the Gulf of
Aqaba, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 564, 594 (1959). Professor Gross quotes Philip C. Jessup as supporting
this position: "'the debates in the Conference [regarding innocent passage] would naturally contrib-
ute further evidence of what states consider to be "a general practice accepted as law."' Id. at 594
n. 186; Jessup, The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: A Study in International Law-Making,
52 AM. J. INT'L L. 730, 732 (1958).
4 1958 Convention, art. 16, para. 4.
5 G. SMITH, RESTRICTING THE CONCEPT OF THE FREE SEAS, MODERN MARITIME LAW RE-
EVALUATED 36 (1980).
6 See Clingan, Freedom of Navigation i a Post-UNCLOS III Environment, 46 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 107 (1983). The traditionally recognized "concepts of the territorial sea and the high
seas were inadequate to accommodate the legitimate interests of coastal states with respect to the
management of resources in adjacent areas. To solve this particular problem, the concept of The
Exclusive Economic Zone was developed" but not adopted in the first two conferences. Id. at 109.
7 A. Pardo, Preliminary Analysis of the 1975 Geneva Single Negotiating Text on the Law of
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The need to establish policies to deal with these issues led the United
Nations General Assembly at its 1970 session to convene a Third Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter referred to as the Third Confer-
ence), pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 3067 (XXVIII),
adopted on November 16, 1973. The Third Conference held eleven ses-
sions from 1973 to 1982. Professor Bernard H. Oxman, who chaired the
United States drafting committee in 1970 and participated in the negotia-
tions, described the object of the negotiations as a codifying of the rules
of international law as they apply to the sea.
Like much of the rest of modern international law, the international
law of the sea evolved largely in unwritten form as "customary inter-
national law," a term used by international lawyers to distinguish it
from international law in written treaty form. The traditional evidence
of customary international law is the custom and practice of states.8
After a decade of deliberations and difficult negotiations, the re-
quired two-thirds majority of participant states adopted a new Law of the
Sea Convention on April 30, 1982 (1982 Convention). 9 The United
States voted against the adoption of this Convention because of the deep
seabed mining provisions. Despite the opposition of several other major
states, the Convention was adopted, and it was opened for signature on
December 10, 1982.10 Over 125 states signed the Convention; nonsig-
natories included the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Jordan."
The Convention remained open for signature for two years from De-
cember 10, 1982, pursuant to article 305. States, and certain interna-
tional organizations, could have become signatories during that time at
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Jamaica."2 In addition, the Conven-
tion was open for signature at United Nations Headquarters in New
the Sea 5 (Sept. 25, 1975) (unpublished colloquium) (available in Woodrow Wilson International
Center). For a substantive discussion on the enclosure theory of the oceans, see R. ECKERT, THE
ENCLOSURE OF OCEAN RESOURCES (1979).
8 B. OXMAN, The Two Conferences, in LAW OF THE SEA, UNITED STATES POLICY DILEMMA
127, 132 (1983). [hereinafter cited as POLICY DILEMMA].
9 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, reprinted ill
Final Act of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, THE LAW OF THE SEA 158
(1983) (U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea with Index and Final Act), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
62/122 (1983) [hereinafter cited as 1982 Convention].
10 Id. For a compilation of documents pertaining to the law of the sea from 1958 to 1972, see
S. ODA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE OCEAN DEVELOPMENT (1972). Mr. Oda's book con-
tains U.N. resolutions pertaining to the law of the sea as well as draft Articles presented to various
committees of the 1982 Conference. See also A. HOLLICK, UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND
THE LAW OF THE SEA (1982) (comprehensive treatise on the Law of the Sea Conferences, including
excellent source material from U.N. documents).
I I See Appendix for a list of Middle East coastal states which signed or did not sign the 1982
Convention as of May 1984.
12 See 1982 Convention, art. 305. para. 1( and Annex IX (defining international organizations
and setting forth procedures regarding ratification, accession and general compliance with tle Con-
1986]
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York from July 1, 1983 until December 9, 1984. The Convention re-
mains open for an unlimited time for accession by states, pursuant to
article 307.
Before the Convention enters into force, however, it is subject to
ratificatiof or accession by sixty states.13 As of April 1986, less than half
the required number of states have ratified the Convention. Naturally,
states which have not signed, or which do not ratify or accede, are not
bound by the Convention, except in those areas in which customary in-
ternational law has evolved.
Professor Oxman points out that a "general allergy to [customary]
international law has been apparent in the negotiation of the Convention
as a whole from the outset."' 4 Oxman suggests that the drafters did not
want new portions of the text to appear as a narrowing or altering of
certain law. Rather, he states that references to international law are set
forth where the text "is not particularly controversial, where delegations
desire to avoid the controversy inherent in dealing with the matter, or
where the international law in question is outside the scope of this
Conference."' 5
Tommy Koh of Singapore, President of the Third Conference, at the
opening of the Convention for signatures, stated that the argument that
"the Convention codified customary international law or reflects existing
international practice is factually incorrect and legally insupportable."' 6
President Koh cited the regime of transit passage as an example of a new,
not customary, concept. His statement was a reaction to the fact that
certain large, economically developed countries, such as the United
States, United Kingdom, Spain and Germany, did not sign the Conven-
tion. The view of the United States was that "while it could not accept
the seabed provisions of the Convention, most other parts reflected pre-
vailing international practice and would endure."' 7
The Middle East states, as well as the Soviet Union, reacted to the
refusal of the United States and other states to sign the Convention. Am-
bassador Timofey Gouzhenko, Minister of Merchant Marine of the So-
viet Union (U.S.S.R.), exclaimed that the United States sought "to
vention. Any references in this article to states will include, where appropriate, such international
organizations.
13 Id. art. 308. "This Convention shall enter into force 12 months after the date of deposit of
the sixtieth instrument of ratification or accession." Id.
14 Oxman, The Third United Nations' Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1977 New York
Session, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 57, 73-74 n.50 (1978).
1- Id. The references to international law in part III of the Convention are few. See 1982
Convention, art. 34, para. 2, and art. 39, para. l(b).
16 Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea. 17 Official Records (193d plen. mtg., Resume
11th Session) at 135, U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 62/123 (1982); Closing Statement by President of Law of
Sea Conference Koh, U.N. Press Release, SEA/513, at 2 (Dec. 11. 1982).
17 U.N. Pfess Release, SEA/514, at 8 (Dec. 10, 1982).
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torpedo the Convention" and that "the Convention is not a basket of
fruit from which one can pick only those [articles] which are fancies."
He warned that a nonparty "is naturally deprived of the rights which are
provided for in the Convention for its participants."' 8
During the Third Conference negotiations, the Soviet Union, the
United States, and other maritime states argued for, and won, the right
of freedom of navigation to be included in the Convention. The Soviet
Union signed the Convention despite its reluctance to be bound to cer-
tain provisions, such as those concerning deep seabed mining. However,
it reacted swiftly to the refusal of the United States to sign by agreeing
that only signatories could benefit by the rights contained in the
Convention. 19
Iraq's representative at the Third Conference, Mohammad al-haj
Hamoud, stated that "[a]ny internal legislation or arrangement among a
few States outside the Convention would lack any legal validity.""0
Iran's representative, Hodjtaba Mirmehdi, at Iran's signing, placed on
record the "understanding. . . that only states parties to the Law of the
Sea Convention shall be entitled to benefit from the contractual rights
created therein."'" Ambassador Mirmehdi stated specifically that this
applied to the right of transit passage through international straits.2
This interpretation is disputed by the United States and other countries
which perceive the transit passage regime in Part III of the Convention
as reflecting customary international law.23 Both the Iranian and Soviet
Union delegates suggested that the world community defend itself
against "the threat by a handful of countries to conclude a separate ar-
rangement" outside the Convention.24 The arrangements alluded to are
bilateral or multilateral treaties concerning deep seabed mining, or in
some cases, freedom of navigation. 5 But for the first time, the 1982 Con-
vention codified a transit passage regime in international straits.
In addition, the Third Conference accomplished what the previous
18 See "Total of Announced Signers of Conventions Rises to 75," U.N. Press Release,
SEA/506, at 4 (Dec. 9, 1982) [hereinafter cited as U.N. Press Release (Dec. 9, 1982)].
19 Id.
20 "Eleven more states and the United Nations Council for Namibia announce their intention
to sign Law of Sea Convention," U.N. Press Release, SEA/503, at 4 (Dec. 8, 1982).
21 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, Declarations and Reservations -
Islamic Republic of Iran, in MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GEN-
ERAL XXI. 6, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER. E13 (Dec. 31, 1984). See also, U.N. Press Release (Dec. 9,
1982), supra note 18.
22 Id.
23 See 1982 Convention, at part III; Infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
24 U.N. Press Release (Dec. 9, 1982) supra note 18.
25 Since the subject of this article is navigation through international straits in the Middle East,
the subject of deep seabed mining is not covered. For an overview of seabed mining issues at the
Third Conference, see A. HOLLICK, supra note 10.
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two conferences could not: the 1982 Convention established a territorial
sea limit not to exceed twelve nautical miles.26 In many cases, as in the
three Middle East straits of Hormuz, Bab el Mandeb and Tiran, a twelve-
mile territorial sea limit had been claimed many years before the 1982
Convention codified the limit. However, the issue which arises is
whether a transit passage regime or innocent passage regime applies to
the Straits of Hormuz, Bab el Mandeb and Tiran, which are all used for
international navigation.
II. INTERNATIONAL STRAITS AND THE REGIMES OF INNOCENT AND
TRANSIT PASSAGE
A. International Straits
International straits are natural maritime passages used for interna-
tional navigation. A "strait may be defined as a contraction of the sea
between two territories, being of a certain limited width and connecting
two seas otherwise separated at least in that particular place by the terri-
tories in question."27 The issue of navigation through straits "has been of
concern since 222 B.C., during the Peloponnesian War. The issue of 'in-
nocent' or 'free' passage through narrow water bodies has continuously
occupied for centuries the attention of political, military, and commercial
interests." 2
8
Pursuant to the 1982 Convention, international straits are those
which connect one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone to
another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone or to the
territorial sea of a foreign state.29 International straits can be divided
26 1982 Convention, art. 3. All references to miles in this article refer to nautical miles.
27 E. BROEL, I INTERNATIONAL STRAIGHTS: A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 19
(1947). Briiel's definition of international straits distinguishes straits from canals; he states that
straits are different from canals because canals are artificially created. Id. at 18. But see R. BAXTER,
THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS 184 (1964) (Canals and straits are treated similarly for
purposes of explaining rights of free passage through waterways).
28 R. Hodgson & T. McIntyre, Maritime Commerce in Selected Areas of High Concentration, in
HAZARDS OF MARITIME TRANSIT 1, 8 (T. Clingan & L. Alexander eds. 1973) [book hereinafter
cited as HAZARDS OF MARITIME TRANSIT].
29 For purposes of this article, the exclusive economic zone (E.E.Z.) and high seas regimes are
treated similarly. Though not the subject of this paper, it should be explained that the 1982 Conven-
tion sets forth the E.E.Z. regime in part V. The E.E.Z. is an area beyond and adjacent to the
territorial sea which "shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the
breadth of the territorial sea is measured." 1982 Convention, art. 57. This regime contains the same
freedoms of navigation and overflight as the High Seas regime. See id. at part VII. Although no
state sovereignty exists in the high seas, states have sovereign rights in the E.E.Z. over their natural
resources. However, this sovereignty is not as exclusive as that in internal waters or territorial seas.
where, in the latter, it is limited only by the right of innocent passage. The sovereign rights in the
E.E.Z. "are economic rights." Oxman, supra note 14, at 68.
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into four categories by customary international law and as codified in
part III of the 1982 Convention.
The first category of straits includes straits which historically have
been regulated by specific international conventions.30 For example,
"Article 1 of the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, which established peace
with Turkey, expounded a principle already in existence before the sign-
ing: freedom of transit and navigation 'by sea and by air' in the
straits."' 31 After the Treaty of Lausanne, the Montreaux Convention of
1936 came into force to regulate the Straits of the Dardanelles, the Sea of
Marmora, and the Bosporus.32 Such straits are exempt from coverage by
the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea because of these specific
treaties.
A second category of international straits, as defined in article 36 of
the Convention, includes those straits in which there exists "a route
through the high seas or through an exclusive economic zone of similar
convenience with respect to navigational and hydrographical characteris-
tics."' 33 Thus, a strait which is wider than twenty-four miles, for exam-
ple, would contain a high seas or exclusive economic zone passage
pursuant to this second category. Such a strait is not covered by part III
of the Convention since it is broad enough to contain a strip of high seas,
and the high seas regime would apply. Normally no jurisdictional issues
arise with regard to these straits since no state is sovereign in the high
seas.
A third category of straits is covered by the regime of transit pas-
sage34 which applies to straits "used for international navigation between
one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part
of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone." 35 Hence, this regime
provides for transit passage through straits36 subject to an exception: if a
strait is formed by the same state's island and mainland and a route sea-
ward of the island exists "through the high seas or through an exclusive
economic zone of similar convenience with respect to navigational and
30 1982 Convention, art. 35(c).
31 CAMPBELL, Navigation, in MAJOR ISSUES OF THE LA\v OF THE SEA 128 (1976), paraphas-
ing The Treaty of Peace with Turkey, July 24, 1923, art. I, 28 L.N.T.S. 115 (Lausanne), and the
Convention Relating to the Regime of the Straits, July 24, 1923, 28 L.N.T.S. 115 (Lausanne). How-
ever, with reference to airspace, it has been stated that "[n]o general principle of international law
provides for innocent passage for aircraft through the airspace above territorial waters, although art.
5 of the Chicago Convention gives such a right to nonscheduled civil aircraft flights" if they are
states parties to the Convention. M. WHITEMAN, 9 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 321-22
(1968); Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944 (Chicago), 15 U.N.T.S. 295.
32 Convention Regarding the Regime of Straits, July 20, 1936, 173 L.N.T.S. 213 (Montreux).
33 1982 Convention, art. 36.
34 Id. part III, § 2.
35 Id. art. 37.
36 Id. arts. 38, 44.
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hydrographical characteristics," then the regime of nonsuspendable inno-
cent passage, not transit passage, applies to the strait.3"
A fourth category, involving customary international law and codi-
fied in both the 1958 and 1982 Conventions, is the regime of innocent
passage through straits used for international navigation.38 However, the
1982 Convention applies this regime only to straits which connect "a
part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and the territorial sea
of a foreign state."' 39 Article 45 also mandates that "there shall be no
suspension of innocent passage through such straits."'
Except for nonsuspendable innocent passage through this fourth
category of straits, as set forth in article 45, the strait states may adopt
laws and regulations concerning: safety, the protection of cables and
pipelines, conservation, marine scientific research and "the prevention of
infringement" of laws and regulations41; surface passage of submarines42;
sea lanes and traffic separation schemes4 3; and special measures for for-
eign "nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear or other inher-
ently dangerous or noxious substances.""
The only infringement on national sovereignty is that of nonsus-
pendable innocent passage as applied to the fourth category of straits.45
The delegates at the Third Conference reached an agreement, not
reached in either the First or Second Conferences, that the maximum
breadth of the territorial sea would be twelve miles, measured from base-
lines.46 It was thought that, despite this extension, the regimes of transit
passage and innocent passage through international straits would ensure
continued, unimpeded passage through waters which had been part of
the high seas, and with the Convention's ratification would become terri-
torial seas.
In extending the territorial seas up to twelve miles, the Convention
37 Id. art. 38.
38 1958 Convention, art. 16, para. 4; 1982 Convention, art. 45.
39 1982 Convention, art. 45, para. l(b).
40 Id. art. 45, para. 2. The regime of innocent passage through the territorial sea would apply
in straits which are not used in international navigation, and a coastal state would have the right to
suspend innocent passage for security reasons. See M. Maduro, Passage Through International
Straits: The Prospects Emerging From the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 12
J. MAR. L. & COM. 65, 75 (1980).
41 1982 Convention, art. 21.
42 Id. art. 20.
43 Id. art. 22.
44 Id. art. 22, para. 2.
45 See Robertson, Passage Through International Straits: A Right Preserved in the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 801 (1980). "Subject only to the right
of free transit, territorial waters in international straits would retain their national character in each
and every respect." Id. at 810 (quoting Stevenson, U.S. Draft Articles on Territorial Sea, Straits and
Fisheries, Submitted to U.N. Seabeds Committee, 65 DEP'T. ST. BULL. 261, 263 (Sept. 6, 1971)).
46 1982 Convention, art. 3.
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seemed to provide more room for states to flex sovereign muscles. Alleg-
edly some 116 international straits which are smaller than twenty-four
miles in width would be affected by coastal state jurisdiction because
their previously high seas waters would become territorial seas. In prac-
tical terms, the three Middle East straits which are discussed in this arti-
cle would not be affected. These straits are Hormuz, which connects the
Gulf of Oman and Indian Ocean with the Persian Gulf; Bab el Mandeb,
which connects the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean with the Red Sea;
and Tiran, which connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aqaba.
Parts of the Strait of Hormuz and all of the Straits of Bab el Mandeb
and Tiran are less than twenty-four miles. Ordinarily, the extension of
territorial seas up to twelve miles by article 3 of the 1982 Convention
would affect these straits. However, their status would not be affected
because the strait states bordering all three straits have claimed twelve-
mile territorial seas for at least the past ten (and in some cases over
twenty-five) years.47 The United States considers straits greater than six
miles wide as containing high seas, and it has navigated freely through
these straits despite the claims of the strait states. Further, the transit
passage regime under the 1982 Convention is not dependent on width.
United States vessels transiting these straits in times of peace will con-
tinue to experience freedom of navigation, impinged only by coastal state
regulation of shipping channels.
B. Innocent Passage Regime
The 1982 Convention reconfirmed the right of innocent passage
through straits used for international navigation which connect the high
seas with the territorial sea of a foreign state. The Convention also clari-
fied certain ambiguities in the 1958 Convention, particularly regarding
the criteria of what type of passage is innocent.
Innocent passage refers to passage through a state's territorial sea
for the purpose of either crossing the sea or entering or leaving internal
waters. Although passage should be continuous, stopping and anchoring
is permitted if these are necessary to render assistance48 or "are inciden-
tal to ordinary navigation or are rendered necessary by force majeure or
by distress."4 9 The 1982 Convention, unlike the 1958 Convention, clari-
fies the meaning of "innocent" in article 19. It lists twelve activities
which, if engaged in by a foreign ship, would be considered prejudicial to
a coastal state's "peace, good order or security," thereby permitting the
47 See Appendix for a list of territorial sea limits for Middle East Coastal states.
48 1982 Convention, art. 18.
49 1958 Convention, art. 14; 1982 Convention, art. 18. "Passage is innocent so long as it is not
prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state." 1958 Convention, art. 14, para.
4; 1982 Convention, art. 19, para. 1.
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coastal state to take action against the offending ship.5 ° P. Jessup, in his
treatise on the law of territorial waters, states unequivocally that the re-
gime of innocent passage needs no supporting documentation because it
is part of customary international law.5
Innocent passage through territorial seas is not absolute since a
coastal state may stop a vessel temporarily to protect the state's secur-
ity.-" However, innocent passage through territorial seas in international
straits is nonsuspendable under customary international law.53
The 1982 Convention treats separately the concepts of innocent pas-
sage in the territorial sea and innocent passage through straits used for
international navigation. 4 Initially, "innocent passage" referred to sur-
face passage.5 In practical terms, however, the passage of vessels in the
Middle East straits in times of peace has included submerged passage and
aircraft overflight by the acquiescence of the strait states. United States
vessels and aircraft have used these straits with the consent of the strait
states, but also as a right under customary international law.
C. Transit Passage Regime
The regime of transit passage was codified in part III, section 2, of
the 1982 Convention, and applies to international straits which connect
"one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another
part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone [E.E.Z.]." ' 6 The
regime of transit passage applies to aircraft as well as to ships. It in-
cludes a presumption that submarines are permitted submerged passage
through international straits connecting high seas or E.E.Z.s.5 7
There are two views on the application of the transit passage regime.
50 1982 Convention, art. 19.
51 p. JESSUP, THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION 120
(1927).
52 1958 Convention, art. 16, para. 3; 1982 Convention, art. 25, para. 3.
53 1958 Convention, art. 16, para. 4; 1982 Convention, art. 45.
54 1982 Convention, part II, § 3; part III, § 3.
55 "And since the concept of innocent passage evolved before the development of the airplane
or submarine, it does not embrace the right to overfly or navigate submerged through the territorial
sea." Richardson, Law of the Sea: Navigation and Other Traditional National Security Considera-
tions, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 553, 560 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Richardson, Law of the Sea].
56 1982 Convention, art. 37.
57 Id. art. 38. International law scholars disagree as to whether, in the 1982 Convention, sub-
marines are permitted submerged passage through straits. Professor H. Robertson states that the
transit passage regime includes submerged passage because of the term "normal modes" of transit in
article 39, para. 1(c). Robertson, supra note 45, at 843. See also, G. SMITH, supra note 5, at 138;
Richardson, Law of the Sea, supra note 55, at 564-66. This writer agrees with the above scholars,
although several others argue that the right of transit passage is not sufficiently clear in the text. See
Ratiner, The Law of the Sea: A Crossroads For American Foreign Policy, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 1006,
1019 (Summer 1982); Reisman, The Regime of Straits and National Security: An Appraisal of Inter-
national Lawmaking, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 48, 75 (1980).
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One view considers this regime a new concept, with the likelihood that
only parties to the 1982 Convention will be able to apply it. Under this
view, nonparties to the Convention would have to operate pursuant to
the innocent passage regime with no rights of submerged passage or over-
flight. The second view, a more practical approach, is that transit pas-
sage merely reflects customary international law through the usage of the
high seas principle of submerged passage and overflight in international
straits.5 8
In a discussion that ocean shipping was a neglected issue at the
Third Conference, Professor Edgar Gold of Dalhousie University of
Nova Scotia, Canada states:
Transit right appears to be well established in international law and
appears in little danger to have changed in principle from the rule as
expressed by Grotius to be: "lands, rivers and any part of the sea that
has become subject to ownership of a people ought to be open to those
who, for legitimate reasons, have need to cross over them.",59
Ambassador James L. Malone, Chairman in 1982 of the United
States Delegation to the Third Conference, agrees:
Particularly with respect to navigation rights, the history of the law of
the sea has been predominately a history of customary rules evolving
through state practice. In this area the Convention incorporates ex-
isting law, which will continue to apply to all states, not because of the
treaty, but because of the customary law underlying the treaty.60
In discussing the Third Conference's Informal Composite Negotiating
Text (ICNT), which was incorporated in the final draft of the 1982 Con-
vention, Professor Oxman stated:
The ICNT approach to transit reflects more accurately the actual prac-
tice of states than theoretical assumptions about extension of the more
restrictive regime of innocent passage, whether such practice is based
on a theory of a three-mile territorial sea or a view that the ICNT
transit principle is declaratory of existing law.61
The issue of whether the transit passage regime applies to nonpar-
58 For the view that the transit passage regime applies only to signatories, see Ratiner, supra
note 57; Reisman, supra note 57; and Richardson, Superpowers Need Law: A Response to the United
States Rejection of the Law of the Law of the Sea, 17 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Richardson, Superpowers]. But see comments by Harlow, DUKE UNIV., SYMPO-
SIUM ON THE LAW OF THE SEA (Oct. 29-30, 1982); Malone, The United States and the Law of the
Sea After UNCLOS III, DUKE UNIV., SYMPOSIUM ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 4 (Oct. 29-30, 1982)
(view that transit passage is part of customary international law).
59 Gold, The "Freedom" of Ocean Shipping and Commercial Viability: Myths and Realities in
the Aftermath of UNCLOS III, in LAW OF THE SEA: NEGLECTED ISSUES, LAW OF THE SEA INSTI-
TUTE TWELFTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE 248, 256 (3. Gamble ed. 1979).
60 Malone, supra note 58, at 3.
61 Oxman, supra note 14, at 63.
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ties, such as the United States, is an important one. If it does not apply,
then usage of straits could be regulated by coastal states beyond existing
regulations for traffic separation, safety and pollution prevention. A
strait state could use the regime of innocent passage, as described in arti-
cle 19 of the 1982 Convention, to hamper traffic.
It is the policy of the United States that the transit passage regime is
a matter of customary international law. Over ten years ago, Ambassa-
dor John R. Stevenson, then Chairman of the United States Delegation
to the Third Conference, stated:
We [the United States] believe we now have - and have always had -
full high seas freedoms such as freedom of navigation and overflight
beyond the three-mile territorial sea. We find the existence of these
rights in straits used for international navigation confirmed by their
historical and continuing exercise. 62
One scholar suggests that if the transit passage regime does not reflect
customary international law now, then "it is entirely possible for certain
norm-creating provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention to evolve into
customary international law . ...
The United States, in recognizing only a three-mile territorial sea,
has treated all straits wider than six miles as having a high seas regime.
Generally, strait states with twelve-mile territorial seas, such as Oman
and Iran bordering the Strait of Hormuz, have not objected to this view.
The United Kingdom also maintains a three-mile territorial sea limit,
and the Soviet Union adhered to a three-mile limit until it became a sig-
natory to the 1982 Convention which set a territorial sea limit up to
twelve miles. The maritime users have navigated freely through the Mid-
dle East straits by means of a tacit understanding with the strait states.
A regime providing freedom of navigation exists in these straits; and sub-
merged passage, where depth makes it possible, and overflight have been
permitted.
62 Hearings on the Status Report on the Law of the Sea Conference Before tile Subcomm. on
Minerals, Materials and Fuels of the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., Ist
Sess. 215 (1973) (Statement of John R. Stevenson to Subcomm. II of the Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction on July 25,
1973).
63 Lee, The Law of the Sea Convention and Third States, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 541, 566 (1982).
Mr. Lee suggests that "special customary rights" might apply to submerged passage and overflight,
Id. at 560. See also A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 233-68
(1971). This writer is intrigued by the concept of special customary rights, particularly with regard
to United States vessels transiting the straits in the Middle East. "General customary law applies to
all states, while special custom concerns relations between a smaller set of states." Id. at 234. It is
possible that if a claim regarding submerged passage or overflight were made against the United
States by one of the Middle Eastern strait states, the United States might argue that if general cus-
tom does not apply, then special customary international law applies because United States vessels
and aircraft have traveled unhampered through and over the straits for over twenty-five years.
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As a consequence of usage, this writer concludes that the customary
international law of transit passage has developed in the area of the Mid-
dle East straits. An issue of whether the territorial sea limits in these
straits are three or twelve miles is not a practical consideration. Certain
traffic separation schemes in the Straits of Hormuz and Bab el Mandeb
require traffic to move closer to the mainland of the strait states than
either the three- or twelve-mile limit permits. In the Strait of Bab el
Mandeb, for example, "the traffic separation scheme. . . requires ships
to pass within three miles of the coast."
64
Eric Brilel, emphasized that "the right of merchant vessels to pass
through international straits in time of peace is. . .definitely recognized
as a principle of existing law."' 65 With almost thirty years of usage and
states' practice, it appears that the 1982 Convention did not change the
straits' regime in the Middle East straits; rather, it codified the existing
regime. This regime of unimpeded navigation, with the rights of sub-
merged passage and overflight, has been ratified by the strait states
through acquiescence. "The extent to which the international commu-
nity employs the great international waterways and to which the territo-
rial sovereign and operators of the waterways have acquiesced in such
usage is in itself sufficient refutation of the contention that rights of free
navigation may be acquired only by treaty.",66 "More research on this
score - and more opportunity to test and ascertain state practice - is
clearly necessary,"' 67 before any definitive conclusion is reached. The
United States position seems to be clear with regard to the transit passage
regime. Although the United States is not a party to the 1982 Conven-
tion, its vessels and aircraft will freely navigate through and over interna-
tional straits in the Middle East. Further, the navigation provisions of
the 1982 Convention "are already regarded by some government and pri-
vate experts, including the authors of the new draft Restatement of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States, as generally authoritative
statements of existing 'customary' international law applicable to all
states.",
68
III. THE UNITED STATES POSITION AS A NONPARTY TO THE 1982
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
After participating in approximately ten years of negotiations at the
Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, the United States did not sign
64 D. O'CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 293, n.212 (1982).
65 E. BROEL, supra note 27, at 216.
66 R. BAXTER, supra note 27, at 177.
67 Richardson, supra note 58, at 14.
68 Oxman, The New Law of the Sea, 69 A.B.A.J. 156, 166 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Oxman,
New Law of Sea].
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the 1982 Convention which resulted from the Third Conference. The
United States did sign the Final Act, which is the formal record of the
Conference, and observer status is available to the United States if it
wishes to participate in the Preparatory Commission for the Interna-
tional Sea-Bed Authority and for the International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea. 69 This status entitles the United States to take part in deliber-
ations of the Commission although it does not permit the United States
to vote.
The Convention remained open for signature until December 1984.
Although the United States did not sign the Convention at the closing of
the Conference in Caracas, Venezuela on December 10, 1982, nor did it
sign before December 1984, it nevertheless may accede to the Convention
at any time. Therefore, it should be made clear that the status of the
United States as a nonparty is not necessarily a permanent status. The
possibility exists, if policy permits, for the United States to accede to the
1982 Convention in the future.
As of this writing, the United States has taken a firm position not to
accede to the Convention primarily because the deep seabed mining pro-
vision "does not satisfy the objectives sought by the United States."7°
The Reagan Administration determined that, for navigational purposes,
signature is unnecessary because customary international law permits
United States vessels and aircraft to navigate freely through and over
international straits.7 '
69 Final Act of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (Dec. 10, 1982) U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/121 (1983).
70 Statement by President Ronald Reagan, Why U.S. Votes Against LOS Treaty, in 82 DEP'T
ST. BULL. 71 (Aug. 1982). It is not the intent here to take a position either for or against the United
States policy regarding the Third Conference. For an overview of United States policy, see A. HOL-
LICK, supra note 10. It should be noted that although the United States is not a party to the 1982
Convention, United States corporations will be able to operate, for purposes of deep seabed mining,
under the foreign flags of states which are parties to the 1982 Convention. In addition, the United
States signed a multilateral agreement with the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Japan, the Nether-
lands and West Germany concerning sites of deep seabed commercial mining operations. Wash.
Post, Aug. 4, 1984, at A19, col. 5.
71 But see, supra notes 57, 58. See also, Hailbronner, Freedom ofthe Air and the Convention on
the Law of the Sea, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 490 (1983). Professor Hailbronner agrees that customary
international law does not recognize innocent passage for overflight but that the 1982 Convention
provides for overflight of international straits in art. 38. However, the provisions of the Convention
do not apply to military or state-owned aircraft. Overflight of straits is normally carried on by
special arrangements or treaties between the strait state and the state seeking passage.
For those nations in which the United States has its own bases or regular access to foreign
bases, the United States has interpreted overflight rights to be implicit in permission to use
the bases. If there are no such base rights, permission for overflight is supposed to depend
on diplomatic clearances (received by filing one-time transit requests with the defense at-
taches three or four days in advance of the flights). In emergencies the United States prac-
tice has been to get clearance, go around, or, infrequently, fly over without clearance. In
practice, the distribution of American bases has obviated serious overflight restrictions.
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Throughout the Third Conference, the deep seabed mining provi-
sions were negotiated almost as a trade-off for navigational provisions.
Between the time of the First Conference in 1958 and the beginning of
the Third Conference in 1973, many colonies in the world became in-
dependent states. Changes became necessary to accommodate these new,
less developed states, including a need to provide more control over wa-
terways and more involvement in the resource exploitation of the oceans.
Only eighty-six states participated in the First Conference on the
Law of the Sea.
By the time of the Caracas Conference in 1973, 149 invitations were
issued, and 137 states actually participated. The major maritime states
remained important, but the fragmentation of the Western bloc and
the importance of leaders in African, Latin American, Asian and land-
locked states increased the number of important states to a score or
more.
72
These less developed states exercised substantial clout during the negotia-
tions, and many of the deep seabed mining provisions in the 1982 Con-
vention are a result of the efforts of these states.
The United States, however, has determined that despite its rejec-
tion of the deep seabed mining provisions, it may "[gain] the benefits of
other treaty provisions," particularly those dealing with navigation.73
The United States maintains a three-mile territorial sea limit. Its policy
provides that the "United States will respect only those territorial sea
claims of others in excess of three nautical miles, to a maximum of twelve
nautical miles, which accord to the United States its full rights under
international law in the territorial sea."
74
Osgood, United States Security Interests and the Law of the Sea, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: UNITED
STATES INTERESTS AND ALTERNATIVES 11, 30 (R. Amacher and R. Sweeney eds. 1976) [book
hereinafter cited as INTERESTS AND ALTERNATIVES]. During the 1967 war, Egypt closed the Strait
of Tiran. At no other time were Middle East straits closed. In March 1986, France and Spain
denied overflight of their territories to U.S. military aircraft on a bombing mission to Libya. K.
DeYoung, Thatcher Stands in Support of U.S., Wash. Post, April 16, 1986, at Al, col. 1.
72 J. NYE, SHOULD WE CUT OUR LOSES? U.S. FOREIGN POLICY & INTERNATIONAL RE-
GIMES 6 (1980).
73 Richardson, Superpowers, supra note 58, at 14. See also Ratiner, supra note 57 and Reisman,
supra note 57 (authors who conclude that if the United States does not become a party to the 1982
Convention, it will not be permitted to benefit from other treaty provisions). Ratiner believes that
the Convention embodies new international law and that the United States did not give "serious
consideration" to this point. Further, he claims that "[w]hat is dangerous for the United States is
the existence of the argument and the potential uncertainty of United States military rights in nar-
row seas during times of crisis." Ratiner, The Cost of American Rigidity, in POLICY DILEMMAS,
supra note 8, at 27, 39-40.
74 Proclamation of President Reagan, Exclusive Economic Zone of the United States of
America, Fact Sheet, United States Oceans Policy 2 (the White House, Office of the Press Secretary.
March 10, 1983).
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Ambassador Malone, as spokesman for the United States, stated
that
non-parties to the LOS Convention will continue to have navigational
rights and freedoms recognized in customary international law, includ-
ing all of the navigational rights and freedoms recognized in the Con-
vention. . . . This is because the Convention cannot deprive non-
parties of their existing rights, either commercial or military. The
United States, in particular, will not alter the operations of its mari-
time forces as a result of its decision not to sign the LOS Convention.75
The United States Secretary of the Navy also has been quoted as stating
that the Convention is not necessary for either the Navy's or the nation's
security.76
President Reagan made it clear in his statement accompanying the
proclamation of a United States Exclusive Economic Zone that "[t]he
United States will recognize the rights of other states in the waters off
their coasts, as reflected in the Convention, so long as the rights and
freedoms of the United States and others under international law are rec-
ognized by such coastal states."77 Mutuality and reciprocity underlie the
decision by the United States not to sign the 1982 Convention. President
Reagan emphasized that the "United States will not, however, acquiesce
in unilateral acts of other states designed to restrict the rights and free-
doms of the international community in navigation and overflight and
other related high seas uses." 78
Treaty-made law is preferential to sometimes vague or ill-defined
customary international law. However, the United States and other ma-
jor powers have not hesitated to use "muscle" to support their policies, if
no treaty exists in an area. For example, in 1951 during an attempted
blockade by Egypt in the Gulf of Aqaba, the presence of British destroy-
ers in the Red Sea helped to promote agreement between Egypt and the
United Kingdom on behalf of freedom of shipping in the Gulf. After the
Strait of Tiran was closed by Egypt during the 1967 Middle East War,
both the United States and the United Kingdom deployed warships in
the Mediterranean Sea to display their military power to warn against
further incidents. Another example occurred in June 1984 when United
States military vessels escorted United States merchant vessels to ports in
the Persian Gulf at the height of the Iran-Iraq war. It is evident that,
due to economic necessity as in the Persian Gulf or to military security as
in the Gulf of Aqaba, maritime states will back their interests militarily,
75 Malone, supra note 58, at 4.
76 Bandow, The Law of the Sea: Where Do We Go From Here, 30 FED. BAR NEWS AND J. 289.
291 (May 1983).
77 Statement by President Reagan, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 383 (March 10, 1983).
78 Id.
Vol. 18:361
NAVIGATION THROUGH MIDDLE EAST STRAITS
with or without a law of the sea treaty, based on customary international
law.
During a 1975 United States conference concerning navigational is-
sues in the Third Conference, Professor Myres McDougal stated that the
"present law is customary law based on retaliation and reciprocity. This
customary law is an important base of power, and it should not be over-
looked or undercut in the . . . negotiations."79 Ultimately, customary
international law was the basis by which the United States declined to
sign the 1982 Convention.
The customary international law, that all vessels have a right to free
and unhampered passage through straits used for international naviga-
tion, "is generally recognized . . . and must be taken as a basis, when
determining the legal status" of international straits unless this principle
is "excluded by positive rules to the contrary."8 No such "positive rules
to the contrary" are contained in the 1982 Convention and, broadly in-
terpreted, the Convention codifies existing law regarding navigation.
The United States relies on this approach. Its policy is that the transit
passage regime reflects the actual practice of states and is law
declaratory.
In the Middle East, a twelve-mile territorial sea limit has been
claimed for over twenty-five years in most strait states. During this time,
United States vessels and aircraft have freely traversed the straits in the
Middle East. Although dependent upon strait states which are allies, the
United States has maintained a policy of free passage through Middle
East straits in times of peace. Once, during the 1967 war, the United
States was denied overflight privileges.8 At the time of this writing,
United States vessels and aircraft continue to navigate freely through the
Strait of Hormuz, despite the Iran-Iraq war in the Persian Gulf.
Ambassador Elliot Richardson cautions that the United States "can
ignore or openly contest the claims of non-friends and discount in some
cases the price we may pay, but persistent challenges to a friend on an
issue of importance to both states can in the long run incur serious
costs."82 As regards the straits in the Middle East, the strait states have
not been challenged by the United States' use of the strait. Instead, the
strait states have acquiesced in the free and unhampered passage of
United States vessels. Except for traffic separation schemes and regula-
tions concerning safety or pollution control which affect passage, free-
dom of navigation in straits has been ratified by Middle East strait states,
and customary international law has evolved in this area.
79 McDougal, Editor's Notes, INTERESTS AND ALTERNATIVES, supra note 71, at 117.
80 Brilel, supra note 27, at 197.
81 Osgood, supra note 71, at 30.
82 Richardson, Law of the Sea, supra note 55, at 563.
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In addition to the rights provided by customary international law,
bilateral and multilateral agreements provide navigational rights to the
United States and other maritime powers. As a nonparty to the 1982
Convention, the United States is in no worse a position than it was before
the Convention. Strait states which have treaties with, and are friendly
to, the United States will in all probability maintain these relationships.
"For foreign policy, perhaps the most important legal mechanism is the
international agreement, and the most important principle of interna-
tional law is pacta sunt servanda: agreements shall be observed. This
principle makes international relations possible." 3 Ambassador Rich-
ardson suggests that in payment for giving the United States treaty rights
to navigate freely through international straits, states may exact a price
"in the form of. . . political or economic concessions [which] could be
exorbitant, especially if we have to conclude a number of agreements."'84
However, the United States has not yet been coerced into concluding any
adverse unilateral or multilateral treaties in the Middle East, and it has
been operating on the customary international law principles of freedom
of navigation for at least a quarter of a century.
Naturally, the most stable and unambiguous position is for the
United States to be a party to a treaty. Absent a treaty, and if necessary,
the United States can take unilateral action by means of force to defend
its freedom of navigation. This is not as desirable an alternative as
treaty-making, but as former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger stated,
the United States will "defend . . [its] oceans interests - and we are
better prepared than most to do so."8 This position was evident most
recently by the March 1986 maneuvers of United States military vessels
in the Gulf of Sidra.
The threat of the use of force was used by the major powers during
the negotiations at the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea. "The
knowledge that great powers can and would, at least in principle, assert
and defend their naval rights of passage through contested waters cer-
tainly played a useful background role in the bargaining at the LOS Con-
ference.",8 6 During the July 1974 debate over transit passage, it was
pointed out by a representative of the United States that the United Na-
tions Charter recognizes the right of self-defense.87 The Soviet Union
83 L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 19 (1968).
84 Richardson, Law of the Sea, supra note 55, at 555.
85 Morris, The Naval Role in an Integrated Oceans Policy, 1:4 OCEANS POLICY STUDY: THE
OCEANS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 73, 76 (Apr. 1978) (Summary of speech given by Secretary
Kissinger to selected heads of delegations at the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, at the U.S.
Mission on Sept. 11, 1976). See also Osgood, supra note 71, at 30-31 (suggesting that force, if used
regularly, could evolve into new law).
86 J. NYE, supra note 72, at 35.
87 United Nations Law of the Sea Conference, 2 Official Records 126, U.N. Sales No. E. 75. V.
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agreed, adding that all ships have the right of free transit through straits
and "that the maintenance of transit rights for warships and military
aircraft was not only consistent with the [United Nations] Charter but
was the only policy consistent with global realities and international
stability."88
Both the United States and the Soviet Union have been concerned
with the prospect of "creeping jurisdiction," characterized as the increase
by coastal states of their territorial sea limits, with a concomitant in-
crease in state sovereignty over the seas.89 This increase in jurisdiction
decreases the area in which freedom of navigation can be exercised.
Creeping jurisdiction is feared because it may lead to limitations in the
superpowers' military maneuvering.
To dispel this fear, states need only to review the show of force used
by major powers in the past. "Force remains the most effective form of
power in many issues and in many situations. But it often proves to be
the most costly form of power" in light of economic costs and the pos-
sibilities of nuclear arms escalation.90 Further, the use of force could
undermine United States policy objectives in promoting global peace.
The sixty ratifications necessary for the 1982 Convention to enter
into effect are likely to occur, according to Ambassador Richardson. He
predicts that because the United States has not signed the Convention,
"[t]his will to a significant degree undercut the position of the United
States as world leader. . ". ."" This "in turn will reduce [the United
States']. . .capacity to influence the shaping of other multilateral under-
takings in ways optimally compatible with our long-term interests."
92
This writer agrees that the United States should, and perhaps will,
4 (1975); U.N. CHARTER arts. 51 and 2(4) (minimum world order enabling states to use force under
limited circumstance). Professor McDougal states that he sees "nothing in the Charter to preclude
the [United States] use of force, if this appears to be advisable to protect our existing rights." Mc-
Dougal, supra note 79, at 156. But see Henkin, Old Politics and New Directions, in III NEW DIREC-
TIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 3 (R. Churchill, K. Simmonds, J. Welch eds. 1973) [book
hereinafter cited as NEv DIRECTIONS] and Ratiner United States Oceans Policy: An Analysis, 2 J.
MAR. L. AND CoM. 225, 231-32 (1971) (view that the use of force is illegal in this context). See also,
Editorial Comments, 78 Am. J. INT'L L. 642, 642-50 (1984) (arguments for and against the use of
force pursuant to article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, by M. Reisman and D. Schaeter, respectively).
88 Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference, 2 Official Records, Statement by Repre-
sentative From the Societ Union 126, U.N. Sales No. E.75, v.4(1975). See also K. KOH, STRAITS IN
INTERNATIONAL NAVIGATION, COMTEMPORARY ISSUES 139 (1982).
89 Foran overview of the superpowers' concerns about the principle of creeping jurisdiction,
see F. LAURSEN, The Law of the Sea and International Security: Aspects of Superpower Policy, To-
WARD A NEW INTERNATIONAL MARINE ORDER 71-83 (1980). See also, R. ECKERT, supra note 7,
at 318-23 (the validity of creeping jurisdiction is questioned).
90 Nye, Political Lessons of the New Law of the Sea Regime, in POLICY DILEMMA, supra note 8,
at 20.
91 Richardson, Superpowers, supra note 58, at 10.
92 Id. See Ratiner, supra note 57, at 1020-21.
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reconsider and decide to become a party to the 1982 Convention. But if
the United States does not accede to the Convention, it is likely that it
nevertheless will maintain its powerful position, particularly because of
its military capabilities. Although interdependence is a necessary part of
the international system of world order, military power is also a require-
ment for stability.
The best solution remains a treaty that protects navigation and over-
flight, improves the existing innocent passage regime and gives at least
an arguable legal basis for acting with such force as necessary to de-
fend all these rights. This is not to say that absent a treaty the United
States could not or would not defend its perception of high seas free-
doms. It is merely saying that if a choice exists, the treaty is the better
way than the claim, counter-claim and customary law route that has
led us to the extended jurisdictional claims we see today. 93
IV. CASE STUDIES OF THREE INTERNATIONAL STRAITS IN THE
MIDDLE EAST AND THE UNITED STATES ROLE WITH
REGARD TO THESE STRAITS
The United States has a substantial strategic and economic interest
in the maintenance of security and stability in the Middle East. The role
of the Soviet Union increased dramatically in this area after its move into
Afghanistan in December 1979. Only Pakistan and Iran remain as buff-
ers between the Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf, from which the
Western world receives over half of its petroleum resources.
Since the overthrow of the Shah by the Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini in 1979, the government of Iran has been hostile to the United
States. It is no longer the pillar of United States policy it was under the
Shah. At the time of this writing, Iran is engaged in a war with Iraq.
Persian Gulf shipping since the Iran-Iraq war began in September 1980
has been interrupted and has at times appeared on the brink of being
blockaded completely.
The Strait of Hormuz is the entrance for shipping in the Persian
Gulf and the exit for oil tankers plying sea routes to distribute their oil.
One major oil route leads from the Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz
into the Indian Ocean and through the Strait of Bab el Mandeb into the
Red Sea. Much of the Western world's oil is carried from the Red Sea by
way of the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean Sea. However, oil and other
commodities are also shipped through the Strait of Tiran into the Gulf of
Aqaba which is the location of Jordan's and Israel's only ports open to
the Red Sea. Thus, the Middle East Straits of Hormuz, Bab el Mandeb
93 Morris, supra note 85, at 78.
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and Tiran play a vital role in the shipping of oil as well as in the shipping
of other commodities.
The United States and its allies have a significant interest in these
straits. The Eisenhower Doctrine, set forth in House Joint Resolution
117, on March 25, 1957, is as valid today as it was over twenty-five years
ago. It states that "the United States regards as vital to the national
interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integ-
rity of the Nations of the Middle East." 94 This policy, along with the
"containment policy of the United States. . .[which was] given solemn
official expression in the Truman Doctrine of 1947, was intended not just
as an American or Western enterprise but as a collaborative effort with
the states of the Middle East and the Gulf."'9 5 It was an attempt to con-
tain Soviet expansion in the Middle East by means of United States sup-
port of Iran and Turkey. With the collapse of the Shah's regime, the
United States has turned to Saudi Arabia and Egypt for help.
In addition to the need for Soviet "containment," the free flow of oil
is crucial to United States allies in Europe and Japan. They depend
largely on Middle East oil for their existence, while the United States is
becoming less dependent. Unfortunately, there is a "growing capability
of radical regional states to attack and destroy critical oil facilities...
and to attempt to block Western access to the [Persian] Gulf itself."96
Ethiopia, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) and, as
stated above, Iran are examples of such radical states; the PDRY and
Ethiopia border, in part, the Strait of Bab el Mandeb and Iran borders
the Strait of Hormuz on the north. If these straits are blockaded or con-
trolled by states hostile to United States interests, it would be a moot
point to consider whether the United States, as a nonparty to the 1982
Convention, would be permitted to navigate through the straits. Regard-
less of permission, United States policy would dictate the defense of the
straits.
In the case of a blockade, the United States would do whatever nec-
essary to open the straits, particularly if requested to do so by a nonbel-
ligerent state in the area. During the May 1984 escalation of the Iran-
Iraq war in the Persian Gulf, President Reagan stated that the United
States was ready to help, but it would not intervene unless requested to
do so by one or more of the Persian Gulf states. Since the Eisenhower
Doctrine, and as recently as ten years ago, the United States has not
94 The Eisenhower Doctrine, H.J.R. 117, as amended, March 25, 1957, 36 DEP'T ST. BULL.
480, 481 (March 1957).
95 Campbell, The Gui/Region in tihe Global Setting, THE SECURITY OF THE PERSIAN GULF 1,
4 (H. Amirsadeghi ed. 1981).
96 Address by Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Joseph W.
Twinam (Sept. 25, 1981), reprinted in 81 DFP'T ST. BULL. 63, 64 (Nov. 1981).
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ruled out the use of force in the Middle East if, for example, there were a
significant interruption in the flow of oil.
When a secretary of state can note with alarming candor that the
United States government will not allow itself to be strangled economi-
cally by Middle East oil restrictions and will use whatever force neces-
sary to avert such an occurrence, it is but natural to presume that such
an exercise of military power will be asserted if vital national security
goals are threatened by restrictive policies concerning the use of inter-
national straits.97
Where no hostilities exist, "it is highly unlikely that serious impair-
ments of naval or merchant shipping will result from the actions of strait
states in a nonagreement situation [e.g., if the United States does not
become a party to the 1982 Convention].98 Bilateral or multilateral trea-
ties can be negotiated, if needed, between the United States and strait
states which are friendly to the United States, such as Oman on the Strait
of Hormuz; the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) and Djibouti on the Strait
of Bab el Mandeb; and both Egypt and Saudi Arabia bordering the Strait
of Tiran.
Freedom of navigation through these Middle East straits has not
depended on a high seas corridor. A twelve-mile territorial sea limit has
been claimed in all three straits for over twenty-five years. Customary
international law has enabled vessels of maritime states to pass freely
through the straits. The United States government
advises its naval vessels not engaged in espionage activities (a category
of ocean use presently beyond the reach of world ocean order, whether
produced by treaty or otherwise) to tacitly observe the twelve-mile
limit. . . . In cases of espionage, the presence or absence of a treaty
will be largely irrelevant, and the consequences of such acts will not be
likely to turn on the source of the international law of the sea. 99
The United States denies that it has specific agreements with states to
provide advance notice of surface warships. "In practice, however, the
United States evidently provides advance notice .. "too
97 G. SMITH, supra note 5, at 83. (referring to former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger). See
also, Kissinger on Oil, Food and Trade, Bus. WK. Jan. 13, 1975, at 66.
98 H. KNIGHT, CONSEQUENCES OF NON-AGREEMENT AT THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS LAW
OF THE SEA CONFERENCE 50 (1976) (A Report for the Working Group on Technical Issues in the
Law of the Sea).
99 Id. at 49.
1OO Osgood, supra note 71, at 13. Professor Osgood considers in detail United States security
interests as well as submerged passage and overflight of international straits. He concludes that
the best alternative to protecting U.S. security interests in a comprehensive treaty is proba-
bly not seeking protection through bilateral or regional treaties but simply through infor-
mal arrangements under existing law, leavened by international agreements that littoral
states, along with great maritime users, should have a fair share of control over the increas-
ingly congested commercial ocean lanes.
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Further, strait states are as dependent economically as maritime
states on freedom of passage through international straits. The high den-
sity of shipping traffic has created a need for health and safety regula-
tions and traffic separation patterns. The 1982 Convention provides for
strait states to designate sea lanes and traffic separation schemes "to pro-
mote the safe passage of ships."'' All proposals, before adoption, must
be referred to the competent international organization, which is the In-
ternational Maritime Organization (IMO), formerly known as the Inter-
Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization. 10 2 As one of the
United Nations' specialized agencies, IMO works closely not only with
maritime states but also with groups of states, such as the Arab League,
to promote conventions on pollution control, health and traffic safety.
"Whatever regulations are devised, however, must be balanced with
the right of nations to communicate by air and by sea."10 3 Over half of
the world's oil trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz, with much of
the trade then traveling through the Strait of Bab el Mandeb on its way
to the Mediterranean Sea and from there to Western Europe. Conven-
tions dealing with pollution, safety and traffic patterns operate to limit
"the lawmaking competence in the maritime field of individual, particu-
larly coastal, states.""0 4 Despite this limit on sovereignty, "[m]utual co-
operation and tolerance are being practiced by Arab regimes. .... ,,.o5
Middle East states are cooperating with the United Nations, as demon-
strated by the large numbers of Arab states which participated in the
Third Conference.
Although the West is dependent on Middle East oil, the Middle
East states are dependent on world trade and specifically on United
States economic and military aid. The fact that the United States is not a
party to the 1982 Convention will have no effect on commerce through
the three straits in the Middle East. Even during the Iran-Iraq war, these
straits have not been blockaded. It has been suggested that:
[T]he oil-rich states of the [Persian] Gulf ... might, in fact, operate
against the vital interests of the United States either on their own, or in
concert with each other, or in concert with the Soviet Union in the
case of radical regimes attempting to come to power under the aegis of
Id. at 34.
101 1982 Convention, art. 41, § 1.
102 For a history of the role of the IMO in Maritime Law, see W. Lampe, The 'New'Interna-
tional Maritime Organization and its Place in Development of International Maritime Law, 14 J.
MAR. L. AND CoM. 305 (1983); R. ECKERT, supra note 7, at 81-84).
103 Grandison and Meyer, International Straits, Global Communications and the Evolving Law
of the Sea, 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 393, 444-45 (1975).
104 Lampe, supra note 102, at 328.
105 Khoury, The Pragmatic Trend in Inter-Arab Politics, 36 MID. E. J. 374, 386 (1982).
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the Soviets. 10 6
In fact, the superpowers have not been involved in the Iran-Iraq war,
except to the extent of providing technicians and military aid. The Per-
sian Gulf states have not requested the superpowers to help but have
joined together to form a more powerful Gulf Cooperation League. Such
cooperation is unique in the Middle East and, one hopes it will be long-
lasting.
A. The Strait of Hormuz
Physical Characteristics. The Strait of Hormuz joins the high seas of
the Persian Gulf with the high seas of the Gulf of Oman and the Indian
Ocean. The strait at its narrowest is twenty and three-fourths miles, and
it opens to a width of approximately twenty-eight miles."7
The states bordering the Strait of Hormuz are Iran on the north and
northwest and Oman on the South. The strait is formed on the north by
Iran's Qeshm Island, the largest island in the Gulf which belongs to Iran,
and several smaller islands. On the south, the Musandam Peninsula of
Oman juts into and forms the strait. The depths on this side are greater
than on the Iranian side. Three small islands known as the Quoins or
Salamah wa Binatahen lie in the strait within nine miles of the
Musandam Peninsula.
The length of the Persian Gulf is approximately 430 miles from its
head at the mouth of the Shatt al-Arab River to its entrance at the Strait
of Hormuz. Its maximum width is approximately 160 miles. Once the
1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea enters into force, the Gulf states
which are parties will be able to claim 200-mile E.E.Z.s, unless they do so
earlier pursuant to their own state laws. If this is done, the Gulf will be
overlapped by E.E.Z.s. The high seas freedoms of navigation and over-
flight will not be affected, but there will be more coastal state control
over resources.
The littoral states of the Persian Gulf are, clockwise from the Strait
of Hormuz: Oman, The United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain (the only
island state in the Gulf), Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq and Iran. Of these,
all but Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (except Sharjah)
claim twelve-mile territorial seas.
106 Morris, supra note 85, at 76.
107 See R. RAMAZANI, THE PERSIAN GULF AND THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ (1979) [hereinafter
cited as R. RAMAZANI, STRAIT OF HORMUZ]. Arab nationalists refer to the Persian Gulf as the
Arabian Gulf. This writer uses the historical name, the Persian Gulf, as conventional Western us-
age. Also, for simplicity, the term "strait" will be used consistently in the singular as applied to all
three Middle Eastern straits. This writer has read numerous inconsistencies, often in the same arti-
cle, and offers an explanation that in all of these straits there are several channels, leading authors to
use the plural form. However, most of the U.N. documents use the singular and, therefore, it will be
used in this article as well.
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"Navigation is possible on both sides of a median line through the
Strait and its approaches."' 8 A channel to the south of the median,
between the Musandam Peninsula and Little Quoin Island is also naviga-
ble and is used frequently by transiting ships. 10 9 This channel is approxi-
mately four and three-fourths miles wide and is entirely within the
territory of Oman. 110 Oman has claimed twelve-mile territorial seas
since 1972, Iran since 1959, and their territorial seas overlap in most of
the main channel, although some high seas remain."
Jurisdictional Disputes. The importance of the Strait of Hormuz as
an international waterway has increased rapidly since World War II due
to the development of petroleum resources in the area of the Persian
Gulf. "In 1973 it was shown that an average of one oil tanker every
fourteen minutes passed through it, and that about seventeen billion bar-
rels of oil - roughly a third of the non-communist world's consumption
- left the . . . Gulf through this narrow strait daily.""' In terms of
tonnage, the Strait of Hormuz is one of the busiest international straits in
the world.
Some 250,000 tons of shipping in about 300 tankers and cargo ships,
carrying both oil and dry cargoes, pass through the strait each month.
These statistics demonstrate that freedom of navigation through the
Strait of Hormuz is vital to the national interests of the Gulf states, as
well as to the entire industrial world, especially Western Europe and
Japan, which depend on the Gulf region's oil. 112
With the growing awareness that control of the strait means control
of oil, the world's focus on the Gulf has led to stricter scrutiny of safe-
guarding oil installations and sea lanes. The need for continued unim-
peded passage and nondiscrimination of ships is essential to exporters,
maritime states and importers. For example, "[n]early half of Israel's oil
requirements are met by ships coming from Iran to the Israeli port of
Eilath" via the Straits of Hormuz, Bab el Mandeb, and Tiran." 3 Since
Egypt has regained its Sinai oil fields, Israel's reliance on Iranian oil has
increased substantially.




III Ottaway, Iran Seeks to Control Persian Gulf Entry, Wash. Post., Mar. 23, 1973 at A20, col.
3 paraphrased in A. EL-HAKIM, THE MIDDLE EASTERN STATES AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 15
(1979). See also KOURY, The Gulf Security and the Linkage Process, THE ARABIAN PENINSULA,
RED SEA AND GULF: STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS 18, 38 (1979); HAZARDS OF MARITIME
TRANSIT, supra note 28, at 12; Young, Persian Gulf, in NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 87, at 236.
112 Amin, The Regime of International Straits: Legal Implications for the Strait of Hormuz, 12
J. MAR. L. AND COM. 387, 392-93 (1981).
113 J. Anthony, The Red Sea: Control of the Southern Approach, Mid. E. Prob. Paper No. 13
4-5 (1975).
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Naturally, the enormous increase in oil production has contributed
to a greater volume of tanker traffic which, in turn, has created the neces-
sity for regulations covering navigation, pollution, and protection of the
marine environment.' 14 The International Convention for the Preven-
tion of Pollution from Ships was signed in 1973.115 It provided for in-
spection of ships, actually carried out by Iran, to discover pollutant-
causing problems. It also helped Iran with its own security. "In the
event that requirements were not met, ships would be prevented from
transiting until the problems were corrected."'1 16 This Convention also
recognized the Persian Gulf as a "special zone," requiring strict meas-
ures for the protection of the marine environment.
1 1 7
In terms of national legislation, Iran "has taken the initiative to es-
tablish pollution control regulations for its territorial sea, and has 'tem-
porarily' extended the pollution control regulations to the limits of the
superjacent waters of its continental shelf."' Iran will extend these reg-
ulations to the limits of its E.E.Z. if it ratifies the 1982 Convention on the
Law of the Sea. Here, also, the regulations provide Iran with the author-
ity to inspect ships for prevention of pollution and, incidentally, to check
for evidence of sabotage. However, since a new regime was established in
1979, Iran is no longer playing its role as protector of the Strait of Hor-
muz. "No sooner had the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini come to power
in Iran than he announced that his country would no longer serve as the
Watchman of the Gulf. . .. 119
The Arab states of the Gulf have been cooperating since the late
1970s. They established a Regional Organization for the Protection of
the Marine Environment in addition to establishing various conventions
regulating control of pollution. 2° These regulations could have been
used to combat the large oil spill caused by Iraq's March 2, 1982 attack
on Iran's Nowruz oil field at the head of the Gulf. However, since the
war has still not abated at the time of this writing, no decision has been
made to clean up that spill for fear that Iraq might attack once more and
cause another spill. All of the states, as oil-producing countries, have a
114 For a list of international conventions and regulations concerning the prevention and con-
trol of pollution from ships, see HAZARDS OF MARITIME TRANSIT, supra note 28, at 40-43, app.
table 3-1.
115 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 12, 1973, in 12
I.L.M. 1319 (1973).
116 Id.
117 MacDonald, The Roles of Iran and Saudi Arabia in the Development of the Law of the Sea,
1 J. So. ASIAN AND MID. E. STUDIES 3, 6 (1978).
118 MacDonald, Iran's Strategic Interests and the Law of the Sea, 34 MID. E. J. 302, 319 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as MacDonald, STRATEGIC INTERESTS].
119 CONFLICT IN THE PERSIAN GULF 4 (M. Gordon ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Gordon].
120 See generally, MacDonald, Strategic Interests, supra note 118, at 302-22 for comprehensive
coverage of this topic.
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common interest in preserving the safety and security of the sea lanes in
the strait. "Despite the 44-month-old gulf war, Iran and Iraq partici-
pated [in April 1984]. .. in a meeting of the regional organization" for
the Protection of the Marine Environment in Kuwait.
121
Historically, Iran has exercised its sovereignty over the strait by po-
licing the entire Gulf area to preserve freedom of navigation. Although
Iran signed the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone, it never ratified it. When Iran extended its territorial sea to twelve
miles in 1959, it was challenged by the United Kingdom, the superpower
then most involved in the Persian Gulf.
The British Note of Oct. 12, 1959 stated that the United Kingdom
could not recognize unilateral claims to a breadth of territorial sea
greater than three miles as valid under international law. Iran, coun-
tering the United Kingdom's protest, stated that she regarded the
twelve mile extension of the territorial sea as essential for national
security.
12 2
Iran's territorial sea limit has remained at twelve miles since 1959.
Before the United Kingdom withdrew from the Gulf area in 1971,
the United States and the Soviet Union recognized the strategic signifi-
cance of the Strait of Hormuz for purposes of both petroleum exports
and military needs. Iran and Oman, the strait states, require permission
or notification for the passage of warships through the strait, contrary to
the international Court of Justice's decision in the Corfu Channel
Case. 123 The superpowers are concerned that such control could estab-
lish a choke on their competing interests. Strategically, "control of [this]
. . .choke point by regional or extraregional powers underlies the mili-
tary value of the ocean . . .[and] has provided the initial grounds for
naval rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union." 24
In 1971 one of the most destabilizing events in a relatively stable
area was Iran's seizure of the three islands immediately southwest of the
Strait of Hormuz, namely Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs.
The seizure occurred the day before the United Kingdom's formal with-
drawal, and an Arab-Iranian conflict erupted. The three islands are stra-
tegically important since a state which controls these islands actually
controls the strait. At that time, the Shah of Iran claimed that a recent
attack on a Liberian tanker bound for Israel in the Strait of Bab el
Mandeb would be a disastrous precedent for the Strait of Hormuz. This
rationale and the specter of a terrorist attack gave Iran legitimate reasons
121 Randal, Gulf Said Unscarred By '83 Oil Spil, Wash. Post, May 29, 1984, at A10.
122 Amin, supra note 112, at 389.
123 Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Judgment of Apr. 9).
124 KOURY, supra note 11, at 26.
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for policing the strait and controlling the islands.125
The Arab states' response to Iran's 1971 seizure of the islands in the
Strait of Hormuz was a hostile condemnation of Iran. This new conflict
led to further cooperation among Arab coastal states. One suggestion
made in 1971 by Arab strategists was to build a canal through Oman's
Musandam Peninsula in order to reduce Arab dependency on the strait.
By 1979, another disruption occurred in the Persian Gulf due to the
overthrow of the Shah of Iran. Iranian troops had been located in the
strait state of Oman since its 1974 Civil War to help Oman and to ensure
further Iranian control of the strait. Two of the strait's three deep-water
tanker channels lie solely in Oman's territorial waters. In 1979, the Ira-
nian troops were ordered removed by Iran's new regime. Up to this
time, both Iran and Oman had supported a "closed-lake concept in-
volved in a joint naval supervision proposal . ,,.2" This concept sup-
posedly would have promoted free passage, not hindered navigation,
through the strait. However, other Gulf states, Iraq in particular, ob-
jected to this idea. Further, "[i]t is unlikely that the concept of a closed-
lake would be acceptable to non-littoral naval powers. Such a concept
could establish a precedent in international law that could be extended to
other closed seas, such as . . .the Red Sea." ' 7 The "closed-lake" con-
cept has been largely ignored since the overthrow of the Shah's regime.
Iran repudiated its membership in CTO (Central Treaty Organization),
"an American conceived defensive pact that was designed to block Rus-
sian expansion into the Middle East."' 128 Iran also renounced its past
policy of protecting and policing the Gulf. By 1980 Iran was in the
throes of the war with Iraq which has been the most disruptive occur-
rence in Persian Gulf history thus far.
The juridical status of the Strait of Hormuz has also been at issue.
A ribbon of high seas exists through some of the strait, thereby ensuring
freedom of navigation in part, pursuant to the regime of the high seas.
When the 1982 Convention enters into force, it will not affect these high
seas areas since, as a second category of straits, the high seas regime
would continue to apply. 12 9
In the majority of the strait, Oman's and Iran's territorial seas over-
lap. Upon entry into force, the 1982 Convention will establish these
parts of the strait as a third category in which the transit passage regime
125 See, R. RAMAZANI, THE PERSIAN GULF, IRAN'S ROLE (1972) [hereinafter cited as R.
RAMAZANI, IRAN'S ROLE]; see also R. BURRELL, THE PERSIAN GULF (1972).
126 KOURY supra note 111, at 40.
127 Id. at 41. See also, A. EL-HAKIM, supra note 111, at 65-67.
128 Gordon, supra note 119, at 17.
129 See chapter II. A of this article for the definition of this category of straits which includes
international straits containing a ribbon of high seas, pursuant to art. 36 of the 1982 Convention.
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applies.13 0  As a practical matter, customary international law has
evolved in the strait since twelve-mile territorial seas have been claimed
on Oman's side of the strait for over ten years and on Iran's side for
almost thirty years. During this time, United States and other states'
vessels and aircraft have navigated through and over the strait with no
suspension of passage and, in practice, the 1982 Convention will not af-
fect any portion of the Strait of Hormuz.
Although Oman was not a signatory and Iran never ratified the
1958 Convention, both states claimed that passage in the strait could be
suspended, pursuant to art. 16(3) of the 1958 Convention. They ignored
art. 16(4), mandating nonsuspension of passage in international straits,
although there has been no evidence of suspension in the Strait of Hor-
muz and no complaints lodged against either strait state. 131
Both Oman and Iran are parties to the 1982 Convention on the Law
of the Sea. Although they believe that sovereign interests of the coastal
state are of utmost importance, their dependence on international trade
underlies the need for freedom of navigation in the strait.
In addition, in the history of the Strait of Hormuz, no aircraft has
been suspended from passage over Oman's sovereign territory. Oman is
not a party to the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation, but
Iran was a party to this agreement by December 1973.132 When the 1982
Law of the Sea Convention enters into force, there will be no change, as a
practical matter, regarding freedom of navigation since overflight as well
as submerged passage is included in the transit passage regime of the
1982 Convention and will apply in the strait. Customary international
law, as codified by the transit passage regime, will continue to exist for
those states which are not parties.
Submerged passage in the strait will not be affected. With depths in
the channel ranging from 160 feet to below 180 feet, submarines are safer
to other traffic in the strait by transiting submerged.1 33 If the Strait of
Hormuz is controlled by at least one ally of the United States, such as
Oman, United States submarines will continue to transit submerged, no
matter what regime is applied in the strait.
This writer disagrees with the assessment of Professor Amin that
"there is little guarantee under international law of the right of passage
130 1982 Convention, part IV, sec. 2. The third category includes straits which connect high
seas or E.E.Z.s to another part of the high seas or E.E.Z.s. Id. at art. 37.
131 On April 23, 1986, Iran reported "intercepting tankers in the Strait of Hormuz. .. .
Wash. Post, April 23, 1986, at A28, col. 4. This type of search has been conducted on tankers lined
up to pass through the strait and should not be considered as a suspension of passage.
132 See Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. (2)1180, T.I.A.S.
1591.
133 J. NOYES, THE CLOUDED LENS, PERSIAN GULF SECURITY AND UNITED STATES POLICY
51 (1982).
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through the Strait [of Hormuz] if both Iran and Oman regard any in-
stance of passage as 'non-innocent.' ""' Customary international law
would require nonsuspendable passage through the Strait of Hormuz.
However, if a strait state determined to suspend passage, contrary to the
dictates of international law, a transiting vessel would have no alternative
but to acquiesce or to use force. It is improbable, however, that Oman
and Iran would agree as to the innocence of any transiting vessel because
these states are politically opposed, although politics change rapidly in
the area of the Persian Gulf.
Most of the Arab states did not take part in the First or Second
Conferences on the Law of the Sea; however, almost all participated ac-
tively in the Third Conference. During the negotiations they "were in a
difficult situation. While they wished to close the Strait of Tiran to Is-
raeli shipping, they needed unrestricted passage through the Straits of
Hormuz and Gibraltar." '35 Further, Iraq did not want Iran to have con-
trol over the Strait of Hormuz. Some Middle East states bordering
straits advocated the principle of nonsuspendable innocent passage for
foreign ships, even warships. "[T]he majority of them, however, in-
sist[ed] that the regime of straits should be strictly confined to straits
which connect two parts of the high seas." '136 This was a reaction to the
innocent passage regime established by art. 16(4) of the 1958 Conven-
tion, which included in the definition of international straits those straits
which connected not only high seas to high seas but also high seas to
territorial seas. 37 The 1982 Convention eliminated this problem by not
including in the transit passage regime straits which connect high seas to
territorial seas.
During the negotiations several Middle East states objected to the
transit passage regime. Egypt's representative stated that ". . . such a
freedom which allows submerged submarines, nuclear or otherwise, to
pass unseen cannot be called anything other than licensing for the spread
of terror." 13 8 By way of compromise, the Middle East states accepted
the transit passage proposal only as it applied to international straits con-
necting high seas or E.E.Z.s to other high seas or E.E.Z.s. International
straits, such as the Strait of Tiran, which connect high seas to territorial
seas were not included in the regime of transit passage. The majority of
134 Amin, supra note 112, at 403.
135 A. HOLLICK, supra note 10, at 294. For references to the Arab States' views on the straits
issue at the Third Conference, see A. EL-HAKIM, supra note 11I, at 49-52; MACDONALD, IRAN
SAUDI ARABIA AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 168-97 (1980); Maduro, supra note 40, at 75.
136 A. EL-HAKIM, supra note 111, at 78.
137 1958 Convention, art. 16, para. (4). This article specifically helped the State of Israel be-
cause its port of Eilath is located on the Gulf of Aqaba and is accessible by water only through the
Strait of Tiran. The Arab states refused to sign the 1958 Convention because it included art. 16(4).
138 A. EL-HAKIM, supra note 11, at 51.
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the Arab states signed the 1982 Convention, with the exceptions of Saudi
Arabia and Qatar, although the situation in the Persian Gulf is now more
volatile than it has ever been.
Many factors contributed to this instability and volatility. With the
advent of the Khomeini regime, the United States in 1979 considered a
show of force in the Gulf to pressure Iran to release United States hos-
tages. A hostile atmosphere also erupted in 1980 when, after the Soviet
intervention in Afghanistan, it was suspected that the Soviet Union
would blockade the Strait of Hormuz "as the prelude to a Soviet occupa-
tion of Gulf oil fields." 1
39
The Iran-Iraq war began in September 1980 with Iraq's crossing the
Shatt al-Arab waterway and claiming sovereignty over it. Since the sixth
century B.C., Iranian (Persian) and Arab conflicts have erupted over
dominance of the Gulf. The earliest dispute over sovereignty of the Shatt
al-Arab waterway goes back to the sixteenth century. 14° However, in
recent years it was believed that the Gulf states were "hostages of each
other. The vulnerability of their most precious natural resource . . .
[was] one of the most fundamental deterrents to their use of military
force." '141 This is no longer the case. Past enmity among the Arab states
has eased into a condition of mutual cooperation in order to aid Iraq in
its war with Iran.
The Gulf Cooperation Council was formed in 1981 and is composed
of the Persian Gulf states of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the
United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.), and Bahrain. The Council is cooperat-
ing "to ensure the safety of oil installations and pipelines" and to con-
sider security arrangements for the Strait of Hormuz. 4 2 It established a
joint command for its combined military forces and has not asked the
United States or any state outside the Gulf area to intervene in the Iran-
Iraq war, except to provide technical assistance and arms.143 From the
beginning of the war, the United States has "pledged to do what is neces-
sary to protect free shipping in the Strait of Hormuz from any
interference.""4
It has been suggested that the oil-producing states can and have
139 Amin, supra note 112, at 393.
140 Notes from Lecture of Ambassador M. Farhang, 37th Annual Conference of the Middle
East Institute (Oct. 1, 1983).
141 R. RAMAZANI, STRAIT OF HORMUZ, supra note 107, at 98.
142 S. CHUBIN, SECURITY IN THI PERSIAN GULF 4: THE ROLE OF OUTSIDE POWERS 157
(International Institute for Strategic Studies 1982).
143 C. BRADLEY, RECENT UNITED STATEiS POLICY IN THE PERSIAN GULF (1971-1972) 130
(1982).
144 Address of Secretary of State Muskie, U.S. Position in the Persian Gulf, 80 DEP'T ST. BULl.
2 (Dec. 1980) (Before General Pulaski Assoc. in Buffalo, N.Y.).
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used oil as a "weapon," for example, during the 1973 oil embargo. 45
However, the United States has not been providing aid to the Gulf states
in response to coercion but, rather, to support the Arab states against
Iran, a mutually hostile power. The United States does not acknowledge
siding with either Iraq or Iran. Publicly the United States maintains a
neutral stance. 146 Privately the United States sides with the Arab states.
The sudden loss of Persian Gulf oil for a year could stagger the world's
economy as did the depression of the 1930's. A [United States] De-
partment of Energy study estimates that the annual losses of three, ten
and twenty mbd [million barrels per day] (which correspond roughly
to the annual loss of production from Iraq, Saudi Arabia, or the entire
Persian Gulf) could cost the United States economy $84 billion, $323
billion, and $686 billion respectively. The cost to [United States]...
allies would be even greater. 147
Since the beginning of the war, Iran has repeatedly threatened to
close the Strait of Hormuz. It has warned that it " 'holds the key to the
Persian Gulf. The Hormuz Straits are a gate' that Iran could easily
shut." '14 8 It is not clear that Iran actually has the military capability to
close the strait, but if it does have this capability, closure is unlikely be-
cause it would be counterproductive to Iran's own economic interests.
Iran's oil exports would cease if the strait were closed, and imports
would not be as readily available. 149
145 For a thorough study of the use of oil resources in the Persian Gulf as a strategy for Arab
states' foreign policy, see Brown, The Oil Weapon, 36 MID. E. J. 301, 316 (1982).
146 See White House Statement of July 14, 1982, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 903 (July 19,
1982), affirming "The United States government has remained from the beginning, and will remain
neutral in the war between Iran and Iraq." Iran-Iraq War, 82 DEP'T ST. BULL. 59 (Sept. 1982).
147 Supra note 72, at 17 (citing 1980 statistics of the Department of Energy in The Energy
Problem: Costs and Policy Options, Wash., D.C. (March 1980)). The price of shipping is increasing
yearly. Lloyd's of London, the largest insurer of commercial vessels, stated that war risk insurance
covering ships but not cargo in the Persian gulf has increased steadily since the beginning of the
Iran-Iraq war. This is particularly true of vessels navigating in the military zone around Kharg
Island. As of May 1984, approximately "twenty-two supertankers reportedly are anchored just
outside the Strait of Hormuz, unwilling to enter it, although several have been there for some time,
waiting for prices on the world market to rise." Getter, Shipping Insurers Raise Rates, Wash. Post,
May 17, 1984, at A29, col. 5.
148 Wash. Post, Sept. 28, 1983, at Al, col. 4 (quoting Iran's President Ali Khamenei). This
writer regrets the fact that most information concerning the Iran-Iraq war is classified information.
Understandably, this is necessary for United States security in the area. However, it has caused this
writer to rely heavily on the Washington Post and other newspapers as sources of information for this
portion of the article.
149 Approximately ninety-eight percent of Iran's oil exports are carried through the Strait of
Hormuz, and Iran has developed a thriving import trade with Pakistan since the fall of the Shah.
See Wash. Post, Feb. 28, 1984, at All, col. I; Kahn, With Its Ports Periled by War, Iran Boasts
Trade with Pakistan, id., Dec. 8, 1983, at A34, col. 2. Even Western states, including United States
corporations, are doing business with Khomeini's government in Iran. Id., Apr. 6, 1984, at Al; id.
Aug. 4, 1984, at Al, col. 2. Further, many countries are getting as much commercial "mileage" as
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In 1980, Iran threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, and it di-
verted transiting ships from its twelve-mile territorial sea in an attempt to
hamper strait traffic. Oman, with the help of naval forces from the
United States and United Kingdom, prevented a closure by permitting
transit through the southern channel within Oman's jurisdiction.
The United States sold arms to Oman as early as 1975, and it now
contributes economic and military support to Oman as a guarantee for
keeping open the Strait of Hormuz. The United States "courts" Oman
by means of its Foreign Military Sales program because Oman holds the
key to the Strait of Hormuz from the United States perspective. The
value of the Persian Gulf was enunciated by a spokesman for the United
States government: the "region remains of great importance to the
global strategic balance and to our national interests." ' The United
States and Oman reached an agreement on June 4, 1980 concerning "a
framework for bilateral cooperation relating to economic development
and trade and to defense. . . in order to enhance the capability of Oman
to safeguard its security .. ."15' When President Reagan feted the Sul-
tan of Oman in 1983, the Sultan said that it was imperative to "develop"
Oman because of "the importance of the geo-political position we occupy
at the mouth of the Gulf."' 152
Iran continues to threaten to close the Strait of Hormuz. However,
as "[v]ulnerable as this passage is to threat or interdiction. . . some re-
ports have exaggerated the problem. . . . Blockage of the Strait by
sunken vessels. . . would not prove workable" because the entire strait
is deep and navigable, and Oman has already permitted transit through
they can from the Iran-Iraq war: The People's Republic of China is selling arms to Iran through
North Korea; France has sold planes and weapons to Iraq and arms to other Persian Gulf Arab
states; the United Kingdom is selling planes to Oman and is helping both Iran and Iraq in troop
training. Weisskopf, China Sells Arms to Iran via N. Korea, Wash. Post, Apr. 3, 1984, at A8, col. .;
Ottaway, Iran Offers Arab Gulf States Peace Pact with Strings Attached, id., Apr. 25, 1984, at A17,
col. 1. "The Soviet Union. . .has resumed its large-scale supply of sophisticated weapons to Iraq.
It continues, however, to supply some weapons to Iran, via Libya, Syria and several Communist-bloc
nations." Ibrahim, The Mideast War, Wall St. J., May 2, 1984, at 1, col. 1. As recently as July 1984,
the Soviet Union completed an arms agreement with Kuwait. The Soviet Union continues to trade
with many "Middle east countries, including vehemently anticommunist Saudi Arabia ... ."
Wash. Post, July 21, 1984, at A1, col. 1. Japan is one of the few countries that has good diplomatic
relations with both Iran and Iraq. This is a necessity since approximately sixty-five percent of Ja-
pan's oil comes through the Strait of Hormuz. The economic dependence of the Gulf states on
imports is almost as great as their need to export oil. Clearly, the Gulf states have an extraordinary
interest in maintaining freedom of navigation through the Straight of Hormuz.
15o Wash. Post, Feb. 13, 1983, at All, (quoting Department of State Spokesman Alan
Romberg).
151 Agreement on Economic and Military Cooperation, June 4, 1980, United States-Oman
(Muscat); 32 U.S.T. 1637, T.I.A.S. No. 979 1; American Foreign Policy Basic Documents 1977-1980,
598, 599 (1983).
152 Radcliffe, Saluting the Sultan, Wash. Post, Apr. 13, 1983, at BI.
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the southern channel. 153 Mines, such as those planted in the Red Sea
during the summer of 1984, might be used and "actual interdiction by
warships or aircraft could, of course, be employed to blockade the
strait." 154 This writer doubts that there will be any attempted blockade
by Iran due to Iran's own dependence on navigation through the strait.
But Iran continues to threaten.
After each Iranian threat, the United States reacts with statements
that it "is committed to keeping the sea lanes in the Strait of Hormuz
open," by means of force, if necessary. 5' Former President Carter, in his
January 23, 1980 State of the Union address, made the commitment to
preserve and protect freedom of navigation through the strait as a reac-
tion to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. President Reagan extended
this "Carter Doctrine" by making the same commitment in 1981 and
thereafter, whenever Iran threatened to close the strait.'56 The United
States maintains warships on both sides of the strait to give weight to
these pledges of support.
To exacerbate problems, and to help Iran, in April 1982 Syria closed
the Iraq-Syria pipeline to the Mediterranean Sea, contrary to pan-Arab
interests. At the same time, Iran threatened tankers carrying Iraqi oil
out of the Gulf. Iraq's exports were reduced from a normal three million
barrels per day to 650,000 barrels.'57
By July 1984, Iraq was negotiating for the construction of three new
pipelines to extend from Iraq across Turkey to the Mediterranean Sea,
across Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea, and across Jordan to the Gulf of
Aqaba, and as recently as April 1986, Iraq announced the second phase
of these pipelines.158 The pipelines have taken the pressure off the Iraqi
economy placed on it by Syria and Iran. United States corporations are
involved in the construction of the pipelines and, therefore, stronger eco-
nomic and political relationships with the West will result. Additional
pipelines will also mean the lessening of dependence on the Strait of Hor-
muz. In addition, the Straits of Bab el Mandeb and Tiran are affected by
the new pipelines. Outlets in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba will
help to ensure freedom of navigation through these straits.' 59
153 J. NOYEs, supra note 133, at 51.
154 Id.
155 Wash. Post, Sept. 28, 1983, at Al; See also id. Nov. 26, 1983, at A16, col. 1; Feb. 25, 1984,
at A25, col. 4; and televised Presidential Press Conference, May 22, 1984.
156 L. Gelb, U.S. Focus on Saudis: How It Was Improved, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1981, at A12,
col. I; See also, Wash. Post, Apr. 7, 1986, at A9, col. 4 (quoting Vice President George Bush af-
firming the United States commitment).
157 Ottaway, Iran Set to Build Three New Pipelines, Exports of Oil Expected to Triple, Wash.
Post, July 31, 1984, at A7, col. 1.
158 1d; Wash. Post, Apr. 27, 1986, at A27, col. 1.
159 See KOURY, supra note I 11. Arab "leaders may still differ on the goals ofsecurity arrange-
ments, but strategy and tactics are being adopted to promote new changes in the environment. ...
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In August 1982, Iraq declared a zone of military operations ex-
tending from the mouth of the Shatt al-Arab river to approximately
thirty to thirty-five miles south of Iran's port of Bushehr. Iraq warned
all ships that they would be subject to Iraqi attack if they were found
within the zone.1 61 Iran's Kharg Island oil depot, in the northern Gulf,
is within the zone, but the Strait of Hormuz, at the southern end, is not.
Nevertheless, if the war escalates to include the strait, the United States
is ready to intervene if requested by the Gulf Cooperation Council.
The Gulf states have resisted publicly from asking for help from the
United States. However,
[c]rises have induced the Saudis to accept an escalated United States
military relationship. Oman, with its historical isolation in the Ara-
bian Peninsula and from the mainstream of Arab politics, agreed to
permit the United States to improve and utilize military facilities short
of [using] actual combat troops. This fluidity calls for sensitive diplo-
macy free of cumbersome formed alliances and agreements.1 61
The fact that the United States is not a party to the 1982 Convention on
the Law of the Sea is not an issue. The politics of the Gulf states fre-
quently change and a Convention on the Law of the Sea will not make a
significant difference, if any, during the Iran-Iraq war.
Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has intervened with
force since the war began in September 1980. One scholar suggests that
"[1]acking leverage with either belligerent, the United States was helpless
to stop the war." 162 The Soviet Union has been wooing Iraq with mili-
tary aid, and their relationship is becoming stronger. 163 Both superpow-
ers have naval forces in the Indian Ocean near the Strait of Hormuz and
in the Persian Gulf. This show of force has been used with constraint
and is limited to maintaining a global balance in the area. The Soviet
Union, like the United States, wants to keep open its options and not side
too obviously with Iraq, in the event that Iran should win the war.
The superpowers have parallel interests in maintaining freedom of
navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, just as they had parallel inter-
This is best illustrated by the building of pipeline systems to ensure the free flow of oil to the rest of
the world." Id. at 45.
160 See HYDROGRAPHIC/TOPOGRAPHIC CENTER, DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY, UNITED
STATES DEP'T OF STATE, NOTICE TO MARINERS, Special Warning Nos. 53 and 62 (Dec. 15, 1983)
[hereinafter cited as Special Warning].
161 J. NOYES, supra note 133, at 132-33.
162 Gordon, supra note 119, at 167.
163 See M. AGWANI, POLITICS IN THE GULF (1978). "Soviet policy in the Gulf since the late
1960s essentially moved on three axes, namely a close political and military tie with Baghdad; a
relationship of economic interdependence with Tehran; and a steady involvement in the Gulf oil
industry." Id. at 138. By 1984, however, the Soviet Union's relationship with Iran had deteriorated,
although after a brief disagreement its ties with Iraq remain strong.
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ests during the negotiations at the Third Conference on the Law of the
Sea. Unlike the United States, however, the Soviet Union is a party to
the 1982 Convention. Nevertheless, if the Convention were in force, the
defense of the Strait of Hormuz probably would be handled no differently
by the Gulf states or the superpowers.
For example, during the northern Gulf escalation of the Iran-Iraq
war in the late Spring of 1984, some Gulf states permitted, perhaps re-
quested, the United States Navy to establish a defense zone in the Gulf.
By June 1984, four Navy warships formed a protective escort for tankers
entering the Persian Gulf from the Strait of Hormuz. Any attack on the
tankers would be construed as an attack on the warships, and retaliation
by the United States, in that case, would be defensible.'" United States
Navy vessels have not been attacked in the Gulf.
Since June 1, 1984, Iran has devised its own method of controlling
the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has declared a "stop and search zone" in the
strait. 165 No maritime states have complained about this tactic and
although ships are backed up going through the strait, traffic has not
been impeded. It is not clear whether the "stop and search" is imposed
before entry into the strait, but this appears to be the situation. Pursuant
to customary international law, passage through straits used for interna-
tional navigation cannot be impeded.166 If Iran is stopping ships in pas-
sage through the Strait of Hormuz, it is doing so contrary to
international law. However, since no complaints have been lodged
against Iran in this regard, this writer believes that the "stop and search"
is being exercised at the entrance to the strait.
Thus far, diplomacy and political maneuvering have been used in
the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war, both by the superpowers and
the littoral states which are not combatants. Although the navies of the
superpowers are in evidence in the area, they have not been overtly in-
volved in the conflict. "Judiciously used (or threatened), military force
can play a critical role in regime formulation." 167 The United States "es-
cort" of United States vessels, its military aid to Saudi Arabia and Oman,
and the Soviet Union's aid to Iraq and Kuwait are efforts to manipulate
the war in the Gulf without outright intervention.
Hopefully, when the Iran-Iraq war ends, stability will reign in the
Gulf and both the strait states of Oman and Iran will support freedom of
navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. The economic benefits to all
164 U.N. CHARTER, art. 51.
165 Ottaway, Attack in Lower Gulf Poses New Problems for Response by Arabs, Wash. Post.
June 12, 1984, at A12, col. 1.
166 As codified in 1958 Convention, art. 16, para. 4; 1982 Convention, art. 38.
167 J. NYE, supra note 72, at 35.
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states dependent on Persian Gulf oil as exporters, carriers or recipients
are also important.
It is clear that the focus of the United States and of the world is on
the Middle East. "President Reagan might well decide, after careful re-
view . . . , that the interest of his country might better be served by
placing a greater emphasis on diplomacy than on military power."'
168
Since the United States has chosen not to sign the 1982 Convention,
United States diplomatic relations, along with customary international
law, will have to suffice. Despite the fact that Oman and Iran claim that
the regime of innocent passage applies in the Strait of Hormuz, Oman is
a friend of the United States and has control over the southern channel of
the strait. The United States is dependent on this friendship. As of this
writing, Iran has mounted another ground offensive, while Iraq sporadi-
cally bombs ships in the Persian Gulf. Negotiations to end the war con-
tinue at the United Nations based on a proposed agreement initiated by
Japan, the state with perhaps the most to lose by interruption in the flow
of Gulf oil, although global economics and Middle East stability are also
at stake. "In the long run the problems of peace and security in one part
of the Middle East cannot be separated from the same problem in an-
other part of the area, for in the last analysis they are rooted in the fun-
damental problem of order in this region." 169
B. The Strait of Bab el Mandeb
Physical Characteristics. The Strait of Bab el Mandeb, translated
from the Arabic as the Gate of Tears, is the western entrance to the Red
Sea. 1 0 The strait joins the high seas of the Gulf of Aden and the Indian
Ocean to the high seas of the Red Sea. The narrowest part of the strait is
a passage between Ras Bab el Mandeb on the eastern or Arabian shore,
and Ras Si Ane on the western or African side. The distance between
these areas is approximately fourteen and one-half miles and the strait is
divided into two channels by the island of Perim: an eastern channel,
approximately one and one-half miles wide named Small Strait, and a
western channel, approximately nine and one-half miles wide known as
Large Strait. 71 Most of the traffic uses the western channel along a half-
mile route that lies two miles from Perim Island and about seven miles
from the African coast. 172
168 Gordon, supra note 119, at 11.
169 R. RAMAZANI, STRAIT OF HORMUZ, supra note 107, at 129.
170 This strait is spelled both as Bab al-Mandeb and Bab el Mandeb. I have used the spelling
found in the official U.N. Documents on the Law of the Sea, A/CONF. 13/6 and Add. 1. For a
brief but concise history of the Red Sea area, see KOURY, supra note 111, at 22-23.
171 R. LAPIDOTH, FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO INTERNA-
TIONAL WATERWAYS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 67 (1975).
172 Anthony, supra note 113. For information as to traffic separation schemes in the Strait of
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Four strait states adjoin Bab el Mandeb: on the African side are
Ethiopia and the Republic of Djibouti, formerly known as French
Somalia or the French Territory of Afars and Issas. On the Arabian side
are the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), to the north, and the People's
Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), to the south, formerly known
as South Yemen and under British control until 1967. Perim Island, in
the narrowest part of the strait, is strategically critical to the area since
control over the island means control over the strait. When the British
relinquished sovereignty over Perim Island in 1967, it became part of the
territory of PDRY. 173 The Red Sea's littoral states are: Egypt, Ethiopia,
Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, YAR, PDRY and Djibouti.
Jurisdictional Disputes. The Strait of Bab el Mandeb provides the
only access to the Indian Ocean from the Gulf of Aqaba and the Red
Sea. Like the Strait of Hormuz, it is characterized under the third cate-
gory of straits covered by the transit passage regime.174 If the Suez Canal
is closed again, as it was in 1967, Bab el Mandeb provides the only route
to the high seas.175
With the opening of the Suez Canal, riparians of the Red Sea use the
strait as a "gate to the East" and and as an "important station on the
great thoroughfare from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean."1 76 Be-
cause the Red Sea serves as a major trade route, there is a large amount
of traffic through the strait. Much of this is tanker traffic coming from
the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz, and then through the
Strait of Bab el Mandeb to the Suez Canal or through the Strait of Tiran
to the ports on the Gulf of Aqaba. Maritime states as well as riparians
are concerned about continued freedom of navigation through the strait,
particularly with the linkage between straits.
The Strait of Bab el Mandeb has created problems for Israeli and
Arab protagonists. Israel is too far from the strait to be able to ensure its
own freedom of navigation; its territory is over 1200 miles away. "After
the Six-Day [1967] War, when the short-lived Egyptian blockade of the
Strait of Tiran was broken, Israel became even more determined to estab-
lish its freedom of navigation in the Red Sea."' 7 7 With the occupation of
the Sinai, Israel developed into an industrious exporter and importer,
Bab el Mandeb, see IMCO, SHIP'S ROUTING AND TRAFFIC SEPARATION SCHEMES: AREAS TO BE
AVOIDED BY CERTAIN SHIPS 54 (1971).
173 A. EL-HAKIM, supra note Ill, at 20.
174 See 1982 Convention, art. 37.
175 See, CAMPBELL, supra note 31. The importance of a Strait may shift whimsically with
advances in shipping technology, changes in trade patterns, or may be affected by political, eco-
nomic, or strategic factors. An example was the closing of the Suez which increased traffic from the
Middle East to Europe, and gave new importance to the Strait of Gibraltar and the Strait of Bab el
Mandeb. Id. at 136.
176 R. LAPIDOTH, supra note 171, at 67.
177 See KOURY, supra note I 1l, at 21.
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enlarging accommodations yearly at its port of Eilath on the Gulf of
Aqaba. It became a Red Sea power without being a riparian on the Red
Sea.
However, in June 1971, the Liberian-flag oil tanker, the "Coral
Sea," bound for Israel, was fired on in the Strait of Bab el Mandeb, alleg-
edly by a commando unit based on Perim Island. This attack on a civil-
ian vessel in international waters was an indication of the instability in
the area. At this time the United States was considering withdrawing
from Ethiopia where, for almost twenty years, it had committed itself to
supporting that country with economic and military aid. The United
States "interests in the Red Sea were minimal. By 1971, the Soviet
Union had lost its foothold in the Sudan, and a year later its experts were
ordered out of Egypt by President Sadat." 178Further, the Arab States
were becoming more unified.
By 1973, the attention of the United States was focused not on the
Red Sea, but "on the Persian Gulf, where it was determined to safeguard
the stability of its local allies and maintain the flow of their oil to the
West." 179 With world attention elsewhere, Egypt, the PDRY and YAR
successfully barred Israel's ships and Israeli-bound cargo from using the
Strait of Bab el Mandeb. The PDRY, then called South Yemen, "as-
serted its sovereignty over the Strait," and the Arab-Israeli war of 1973
erupted in full.1 80 The blockade of the strait was officially undeclared but
remained in effect until Israel sent commando units "more than 1200
miles beyond its borders to occupy several uninhabited islands within 85
miles of the Bab el Mandeb."' 81 These islands, known as the Hanish
group, including the largest island, Great Hanish, and claimed as sover-
eign territory by the YAR, are located approximately twenty miles off
the coast of the YAR. The Israeli commandos stayed on the islands to
prevent any further attack at the strait until a cease-fire was reached.
After the 1973 war, a major Arab objective was to minimize any
influence in the area by the United States and the Soviet Union. In this
connection, guidelines were recommended during the Third Conference
on the Law of the Sea.
On Straits, the Committee of Arab Experts recognized that its mem-
bers have overwhelmingly supported the principle of "freedom of navi-
gation" through Straits which are used for international navigation
178 M. ABIR, SHARM AL-SHEIKH - BAB AL-MANDEB: THE STRATEGIC BALANCE AND
ISRAEL'S SOUTHERN APPROACHES 15 (1974).
179 Id. at 20.
180 R. LAPIDOTH-ESCHELBACHER, THE RED SEA AND THE GULF OF ADEN, 148 (1982).
181 At the Gates of Tears, TIME, Mar. 19, 1973, at 27. "United States aircraft flying to Israel on
resupply missions were forced to fly through the Straits of Gilbraltar rather than overfly the territory
of allied states that were unwilling to grant overflight rights in time of crisis." Robertson, supra note
45, at 841 n. 198.
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between parts of the high seas but only insofar as merchant shipping
and civil aviation were concerned. As to noncommercial navigation
such as the passage of warships, submarines and military aircraft, the
Committee arrived at no decision.18
2
In 1975 the United States and Israel signed a Memorandum of
Agreement regarding the Red Sea area.183 Paragraph fourteen of the
Agreement provides that the United States government regards the Strait
of Bab el Mandeb as an international waterway, along with the Strait of
Gibraltar, "[iln accordance with the principle of freedom of navigation
on the high seas and free and unimpeded passage through and over
straits connecting international waters .. ."184 The United States also
supports "Israel's right to free and unimpeded passage through such
straits. . .[recognizing] Israel's right to freedom of flights over the Red
Sea and such straits . ,,.8I Although the Memorandum has no force
in international law, it demonstrates the policy of the United States re-
garding the Strait of Bab el Mandeb and its support of Israel's and all
states' rights to freedom of navigation through the strait. One scholar
suggests that the wording of paragraph fourteen implies "that the parties
intended by it to recognize a pre-existing right. . .[and that this para-
graph] was not abrogated when the agreement was superseded by the
1979 Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel. Moreover it has specifi-
cally been stated that it has not been terminated or altered by the conclu-
sion of the Peace Treaty." 186
By 1978, the PDRY specifically recognized the regime of transit
passage by confirming "its respect for the freedom of maritime and air
traffic of ships and aircraft of all coastal and non-coastal States, without
prejudice .. ."187 This is substantiated by the nondiscriminatory treat-
ment of ships through the Strait of Bab el Mandeb. Except for incidents
during the early 1970's relating to Israeli shipping, maritime and air traf-
fic have been unimpeded in the strait. However, when the YAR signed
the 1982 Convention, in addition to emphasizing its policy of adhering
"to the concept of general international law concerning free passage," it
stated that its signature "in no way implies that we recognize
Israel. . . 188 The Arab strait states appeared unified in strengthening
182 A. EL-HAKIM, supra note 111, at 46.
183 SEN. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, ISRAELI-UNITED STATES MEMORANDUM ON MIL-
ITARY EQUIPMENT ENERGY NEEDS VIOLATION OF AGREEMENT, H.R. Doc. No. 152, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 121, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 1468 (1975) (Memorandum of Agreement between the govern-
ments of Israel and the United States; United States - Israeli Assurances).
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 R. LAPIDOTH-ESCHELHACHER, supra note 180, at 148.
187 Id. at 149; U.N. Communication, U.N. Doc. NV/78/63 (July 12, 1978).
188 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, Declarations and Reservations -
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their control in the Red Sea in the event of another conflict with Israel
and in protecting the sea lanes for Arab oil transports in case of at-
tempted disruption. However, the influence of the superpowers was also
in evidence in the Red Sea.
In order to control effectively the Strait of Bab el Mandeb, all strait
states would have to be in agreement. As with the political differences
between Oman and Iran at the Strait of Hormuz, jurisdiction in the Strait
of Bab el Mandeb is divided between the YAR and PDRY, on the Ara-
bian side, and Ethiopia and Djibouti on the African shore. Agreement
among these states does not appear forthcoming.
"Djibouti's only importance is its geostrategic position located on
one side of the Strait of Bab el Mandeb [and] . . . both Ethiopia and
Somalia seem to have annexation intentions toward Djibouti."' 189 Con-
sequently, the Arab states rushed Djibouti through membership in the
Arab League in 1977 to discourage annexation attempts. Djibouti re-
mains pro-Western politically, and in August 1984, France announced it
would reinforce its military presence in its former colony. 190
In contrast, Ethiopia has been a close ally of the Soviet Union since
the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie's government in 1974. Ethiopia
established a Communist Party system of government in September
1984, although it has accepted aid from the United States, and recently
"has been wooing western business and aid."'' The PDRY also is an
ally of the Soviet Union, and the United States now warns its vessels
against entering the PDRY's twelve-mile territorial sea because "there
have been previous incidents of attack on American ships" by the
PDRY.'92 Incident to the PDRY's threats on YAR sovereignty, the
United States has established an economic development and assistance
program to benefit the YAR. 193 At the same time, the YAR and the
Soviet Union have established a treaty of cooperation and friendship.' 94
Strategically, both the United States and the Soviet Union favor un-
restricted passage through the Strait of Bab el Mandeb in order to be able
to move their fleets along the Indian Ocean-Mediterranean route. There
Yemen, in MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL XX1.6, U.N.
Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/3 (Status as of Dec. 31, 1982).
189 KOURY, supra note 111, at 23.
190 Fuestal, Iraq Claims New Attack in Gulf, Says it Will Continue Seige, Wash. Post, Aug. 10,
1984, at AI8, col. 3.
191 Murphy, Top Ethiopian Diplomat Requests Asylum, Wash. Post, May 8, 1984, at Al, col. 6.
192 Special Warning, supra note 160, No. 55.
193 The U.S., through its Agency for International Development (AID), has promoted an eco-
nomic and development assistance program to benefit the YAR. Information can be found in the
yearly USAID publication for the fiscal years 1981-1985. See Congressional Presentation, Near East
vol., Program Justification for the YAR.
194 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and the YAR, Oct. 9, 1984 in
Moscow reprinted in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Oct. 11, 1985, at H3-H5.
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have been no indications that the strait states "are disposed to interfere
with free passage through the Bab el Mandeb."' 195
Yet, as recently as August 1984, mines were sown in the Strait of
Bab el Mandeb and the Gulf of Suez. Nineteen ships from approxi-
mately twelve countries were struck without serious damage. Egypt's
President Hosni Mubarak asked the United Kingdom, France, Italy and
the United States to send minesweepers "to help clear the Red Sea's busy
shipping lanes." 196 The mining of the Red Sea could have dire conse-
quences to shipping, particularly with regard to linkage because the Red
Sea provides an alternate shipping route if the Strait of Hormuz is block-
aded. On August 17, 1984, Iran's Parliamentary Speaker, Hojatoleslam
Ali Akbar Hasheini Rafsanjani, warned that Iran would delay ships in
the Strait of Hormuz "in retaliation" for any delay in Iran's shipping
"under the pretext of searching" for mines in the Red Sea and Suez
Canal. 197
Several states have been considered as perpetrators, but the strong-
est allegations are that Iran or Libya caused the mining to warn Arab
states against helping Iraq in the Persian Gulf war. Iran and Libya have
both warned states against sending arms to Iraq or permitting Iraq to
pipe its oil to ports in the Red Sea. Although Iran's leader, the Ayatol-
lah Ruhollah Khomeini, denied that Iran was involved in the mining,
Iran's Prime Minister made a statement as early as October 1980, before
the United Nations Security Council, warning "all those who, through
the port of Aqaba in Jordan, send arms and munitions and spare parts to
Iraq." '198 Further, Iran's state-run radio broadcast that the mining was
"a blow against the 'arrogant powers' of the world." 19 9 A reasonable
conclusion is that Iran was diverting attention to the Red Sea from the
Persian Gulf.
The littoral Red Sea states invited outside states to help in a mul-
tinational search for mines. At no time during the search did any issue
arise concerning passage through territorial seas. As a practical matter,
the 1982 Convention's territorial sea limit of up to twelve miles would
have no effect on the Strait of Bab el Mandeb. The strait states of Ethio-
195 KHADDURI & DIXON, Passage Through International Waterways, MAJOR MIDDLE EAST-
ERN PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 65, 87 (M. Khadduri ed. 1972).
196 Priest, U.S. Helicopters Sent to Egypt to Clear Mines, Wash. Post, Aug. 7, 1984, at A1, col.
1. In the Strait of Bab el Mandeb alone, seven vessels were damaged by mines on Aug. 2, 1984. Id.
The PDRY asked for and received help from the Soviet Union to sweep its waters for mines.
197 Gumucio, Iran Threatens to Block Persian Gulf Entrance, Wash. Post, Aug. 18, 1984, at
A21, col. 5.
198 Statement by Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Rajai of the Islamic Replublic of Iran, re-
printed in T. ISMAEL, IRAQ AND IRAN: ROOTS OF CONFLICT, 212-13, app. 11 (1982) (statement
made before the U.N. Security Council on Oct. 17, 1980).
199 Atkinson, Helicopters En Route to Egypt, Wash. Post, Aug. 8 1984, at Al, col. 6. By Sep-
tember 1984 only one mine (Soviet-made) had been found in the Red Sea.
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pia, Djibouti, YAR and PDRY have claimed twelve-mile territorial sea
limits for many years, in Ethiopia's case for thirty
years. 200Nonsuspendable innocent passage has been permitted in the
strait, but submerged passage is "ruled out for use by submerged nuclear
submarines" because the waters in the strait are too shallow.
20 1
The 1982 Convention provides, in article 37, that the regime of
transit passage applies to a strait such as Bab el Mandeb which connects
one part of the high seas or E.E.Z. to another part of the high seas or
E.E.Z. Since transit passage provides for overflights, again the issue
arises as to whether only states which are parties to the 1982 Convention
would be permitted such use.20 2 Because the United States is not a party,
it would appear that in order for United States aircraft to overfly the
Strait of Bab el Mandeb, they would have to be granted permission by
the strait states.
However, the same argument made concerning the Strait of Hor-
muz applies to the Strait of Bab el Mandeb as well. The United States
would not agree to a requirement of advance notice because this "would
run the risk of leading to coastal-state control of transit. '20 3 The United
States position regarding a strait greater than six miles is that, pursuant
to customary international law, a high seas regime exists in the strait, and
there would be no need to request permission to transit or overfly the
strait.2°4
In any case, it has been the practice of the United States to respect
territorial seas of foreign states except in circumstances of overriding in-
terest where the United States has had to penetrate a territorial sea. As
with its goals in the Persian Gulf, United States goals in the area of the
Red Sea and the Strait of Bab el Mandeb include continued treatment of
the strait as an international strait for purposes of freedom of navigation
for all vessels and aircraft. The 1975 Memorandum of Agreement be-
tween the United States and Israel emphasizes this point.
C. The Strait of Tiran
Physical Characteristics. The Strait of Tiran is the western and prin-
cipal entrance of the Gulf of Aqaba and joins the Gulf with the Red Sea.
The Gulf of Aqaba is ninety-six miles long and is approximately fourteen
200 See Appendix.
201 Alexander, Coastal State Competence to Regulate Traffic in Straits and Other Areas Near
Their Coast Against World Community Needs to Maximize Vessel Mobility, 19 HAZARDS OF MARI-
TIME TRANSIT, supra note 28, at 23.
202 See supra note 58, and accompanying text.
203 A. HOLLICK & R. OSGOOD, NEW ERA OF OCEAN PoLITIcS 92 n.10 (1974). "In practice,
however, the United States evidently provides advance notice of surface ships." Id.
204 Since the Strait of Bab el Mandeb is shallow, submerged passage is evidently not an issue.
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miles wide at its widest part.2" 5 The Strait of Tiran is characterized in
the fourth category of straits20 6 as a territorial sea connecting high seas to
the territories of Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Of these, only
Egypt and Saudi Arabia border the strait.207 The ports at the head of the
Gulf are: Eilath, on the western side, Israel's only outlet to the Gulf and
Red Sea, and on the eastern side, the port of Aqaba, Jordan's only
outlet.208
The Strait of Tiran is approximately three miles wide and lies be-
tween Egypt on the west and Saudi Arabia on the east.20 9 Two main
islands are located in the strait, Tiran and Sanafir, which have been
under Egyptian control for over thirty years. The navigable waterway
lies to the west of these islands and is formed by coral reefs into two
channels; one of them, the Enterprise Passage, is the more navigable
channel.210 It is approximately 1300 yards wide and is exclusively within
Egypt's territorial sea.211
Both Egypt and Saudi Arabia claimed twelve-mile territorial seas in
1958, although even before this their territories encompassed the three-
mile strait. Thus, the extension of territorial seas by the 1982 Conven-
tion2 12 will have no effect on this strait for navigational purposes. The
regime of nonsuspendable innocent passage will continue to apply to the
Strait of Tiran pursuant to customary international law, the 1958 Con-
vention and the 1982 Convention, because it is an international strait
which joins the high seas of the Red Sea to the territorial seas of foreign
states.
Jurisdictional Disputes. The Strait of Tiran has been the cause of
discontent, even war, between Israel and Egypt, especially after Israel
became a sovereign state in 1948. From 1949 until the mid-1970's, ships
bound for Israel had a difficult time passing through the strait due to
Egyptian regulations. In 1955, Israel completed its port of Eilath, and
Egypt affirmed an outright prohibition against Israeli shipping by issuing
regulations requiring three-day advance notice for transiting the strait.
During the 1956 Sinai campaign, however, Israel occupied the strategic
205 ElBaradei, The Egyptian - Israeli Peace Treaty and Access to the Gulf of Aqaba: A New
Legal Regime, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 532 (1982); see also Preparatory Documents, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 13/6 and Add. 1 (setting forth the length as about 96 miles, the breadth at the entrance as
5 3/4 miles, and the breadth at the head narrowing to 3 miles).
206 1982 Convention, art. 45.
207 Selak, A Consideration of the Legal Status of the Gulf ofAqaba, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 660, 662
(1958).
208 Id. at 667.
209 ElBaradei, supra note 205, at 532.
210 See id; Selak, supra note 207, at 660.
211 ElBaradei, supra note 205, at 532.
212 1982 Convention, art. 3.
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islands of Tiran and Sanafir and opened the strait to all ships.213
The consensus of legal opinion following the 1956 Sinai conflict was
that "the Gulf of Aqaba was international in character since it was
shared by four states and that the Strait of Tiran was also international in
character because it connected the Gulf to the high seas." '2 14 This inter-
pretation was challenged by the Arab states who refused to sign the 1958
Convention because art. 16(4) of that Convention permitted nonsuspend-
able innocent passage through straits which connected high seas to the
territorial sea of a foreign state, and the Strait of Tiran was characterized
as such a strait.
One argument put forward, but unconvincing to the Arab states,
was the determination made in 1949 by the International Court of Justice
in the Corfu Channel Case that the passage of a British warship was in-
nocent, although it "had a clear political aim and was accompanied by a
manifestation of power. 21 5 The Arab states distinguished this case be-
cause it concerned a strait which connected only high seas, unlike the
Strait of Tiran, which connects the high seas to territorial seas. Neither
would the Arab states agree that the 1958 Convention merely codified
customary international law and, therefore, most did not sign the 1958
Convention.21 6
In 1957, Israeli forces withdrew from the area of the Strait of Tiran,
in compliance with a U.N. General Assembly Resolution,217 and a U.N.
emergency force (U.N.E.F.) moved in to control the strait. For almost
ten years the strait was open to international navigation.
However, in 1967, UNEF withdrew at the request of the President
of the United Arab Republic, and "war inexorably followed. ' 218 Egypt
had announced its blockade of the Strait of Tiran for all Israeli ships and
for cargo bound for Israel and as a result, the Arab-Israeli conflict esca-
lated into a full-scale war. The President of the United States, then Pres-
ident Lyndon Johnson, stated in 1967 that "the United States considered
the gulf [of Aqaba] to be an international waterway and . . . that a
blockade of Israeli shipping is illegal and potentially, disastrous to the
cause of peace. The right of free, innocent passage of the international
213 For a history of the Arab-Israeli conflict over the Strait of Tiran, see A. EL-HAKIM, supra
note 111; R. LAPIDOTH, supra note 171; and Gross, Passage Through the Strait of Tiran and in the
Gulf ofAqaba, 33 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Gross, Strait of Tiran].
214 Glassner and Unger, Israel's Maritime Boundaries, I OCEANS DEV. & INT'L L. J. 303, 307
(1974).
215 R. LAPIDOTH, supra note 171, at 14; Corfu Channel case, supra note 123.
216 See A. EL-HAKIM, supra note 111, at 4; Robertson, supra note 45, at 811.
217 G.A. Res. 1124, 11 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 62, U.N. Doc. A/3572 (1957).
218 KHADDURI & DIXON, supra note 195, at 78. See also Khadduri, Some LegalAspects ofthe
Arab-Israeli Conflict of 1967, in THE SEARCH FOR WORLD ORDER, STUDIES BY STUDENTS AND
COLLEAGUES OF QUINCY WRIGHT 238 (Lepawsky, Buehrig & Lasswell eds. 1971).
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waterway is a vital interest of the entire international community. 2 1 9
However, Israel retook control of the Sinai Peninsula and the strait and,
by again occupying the islands of Tiran and Sanafir, reopened the strait
to international traffic. 20
In 1979, a Treaty of Peace was concluded between the governments
of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel. 21 Art. V(2) of
that treaty refers to the Strait of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba which are
considered by the parties "to be international waterways open to all na-
tions for unimpeded and nonsuspendable freedom of navigation and
overflight. '22 2 Since the navigable portion of the strait lies solely within
Egypt's territorial sea, the 1979 Treaty can be easily enforced by Egypt.
Saudi Arabia is not a party to the 1979 Treaty, nor did it sign the
1982 Convention of the Law of the Sea. Nevertheless, since the reopen-
ing of the strait in 1967, all vessels have enjoyed nondiscriminatory free-
dom of passage in the strait without protest by the Saudis. If Saudi
Arabian and United States ties become stronger, the Saudis should con-
tinue to acquiesce in freedom of passage through the Strait of Tiran.
The strait's regime, established by the 1979 Treaty of Peace, 2 3 con-
forms to the regime of transit passage set forth in part III of the 1982
Law of the Sea Convention. The "Treaty goes beyond the long-estab-
lished regime of innocent passage in the territorial sea, a regime that has
been regarded as equally applicable to the Strait of Tiran under both the
[1958] Geneva Convention and the UNCLOS III . . . [1982] Conven-
tion." ' 4 The 1979 Treaty of Peace, in art. V(2), and the 1982 Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea, in art. 38(2), both use the terms "freedom of
navigation and overflight" to denote a regime of transit passage.22 5
The 1982 Convention's part III on transit passage is not applicable
to a strait such as the Strait of Tiran, except that art. 45 of the 1982
Convention applies the regime of nonsuspendable innocent passage to the
Strait of Tiran. Again, this strait is categorized in the fourth category of
straits because it connects high seas to the territorial seas of foreign
219 Statement by President Johnson (Press Release May 23, 1967), in 56 DEP'T ST. BULL. 870,
870-71 (June 12, 1967).
220 As of Jan. 23, 1978, the Embassy of Israel in Washington, D.C. confirmed that Israel main-
tained control of these islands. See J. NOYES, supra note 133, at 38 n.24.
221 The 1979 Treaty of Peace provides for Egyption civil police and U.N.E.F. control of Zone
C, which includes those islands, after phased withdrawal of Israeli forces. See Treaty of Peace Be-
tween the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel, Mar. 26, 1979, Egypt-Israel, Annex I, art.
II, para. C, reprinted in Egypt and Israel Sign Treaty of Peace, 79 DEP'T ST. BULL. 1, 5 (May 1979)
[hereinafter cited as Egypt and Israel Sign Treaty].
222 Id. at 4.
223 Id.
224 ElBaradei, supra note 205, at 550.
225 See also, Lapidoth, The Strait of Tiran, the Gulf ofAqaba, and the 1979 Treaty of Peace
Between Egypt and Israel, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 84, 105-07 (1983).
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states. The 1979 Treaty of Peace establishes freedom of navigation in the
strait, but it is binding only on states which are parties to the treaty and
on assenting third states.226
Arab states which are parties to the 1982 Convention would insist
that the Strait of Tiran has not been "elevated" to a strait in the first
category,227 since the 1979 Treaty of Peace is not a "long-standing" con-
vention. However, one scholar suggests that by the time the 1982 Con-
vention enters into force, it may be long-standing.228
In addition, Egypt, Israel and the United States reached an agree-
ment on August 3, 1981 on the establishment and maintenance of a Mul-
tinational Force and Observers (M.F.O.) for the Sinai Peninsula,
including the area of the Strait of Tiran.229 The agreement ensures "the
freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran in accordance with
article V of the [1979] Treaty of Peace."' 231 Since the United States is a
party to the 1981 Agreement establishing an M.F.O., freedom of naviga-
tion through the Strait of Tiran is assured to the United States. Further,
Egypt controls the navigable portion of the strait. If both Egypt and
Saudi Arabia remain friendly with the United States, United States ves-
sels and aircraft would be permitted to navigate freely through and over
the strait, even without an agreement.
Article V of the 1979 Treaty of Peace states that freedom of naviga-
tion and overflight apply to all states using the Strait of Tiran. "Such a
right for third states, which is more inclusive in nature and scope than
existing customary international law and multilateral treaty rights, could
be exercised upon the assent of a third state, which is presumed so long
as the contrary is not indicated. ' 23 The only other Arab state, besides
226 ElBaradei, supra note 205, at 533. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 36,
para. 1, U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, Sessions 1 and 2 (26 Mar.-24 May, 1968 and 9
Apr.- 22 May, 1969), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969). See also, I. ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW
OF TREATIES 238-39 (1974).
227 See 1982 Convention, art. 35(c).
228 Lapidoth, supra note 225, at 106. Professor Lapidoth suggests that if United Nations Se-
curity Council Resolution (U.N.S.C.R.) 242, adopted unanimously on Nov. 22, 1967, is determina-
tive of customary international law in the strait, then its adoption in 1967 would permit the 1979
Treaty of Peace to be treated as "long-standing," pursuant to art. 35(c) of the 1982 Convention.
U.N.S.C.R. 242 emphasized the necessity for freedom of navigation in the area of the Strait of Tiran.
See S.C. Res. 242, 22 U.N. SCOR Resolutions and Decisions, at 8, U.N. Doc. S/INF/22 Rev. 2
(1967).
229 The M.F.O. was established as an alternative to the U.N. Emergency Forces and Observers
(U.N.E.F.) set forth in art. VI of Annex I of Protocol Concerning Israeli Withdrawal and Security
Arrangements. See Sinai Multinational Force and Observers Established, 20 I.L.M. 1190 (1982)
(Protocol Established the Sinai Multinational Force and Observers).
230 Id. at 1191 (Annex, para. 10(d)). See also Lapidoth, supra note 225, at 102.
231 ElBaradei, supra note 205, at 553. Because the 1979 Treaty of Peace does not set forth
coastal state regulations, Professor ElBaradei suggests that the Treaty should be supplemented to
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Egypt, to endorse the 1979 Treaty of Peace was Oman.23 2 Saudi Arabia,
Jordan and the remainder of the Arab world maintain several unresolved
issues concerning the State of Israel.
Arguments enunciated before the 1979 Treaty of Peace and the 1981
Agreement have not changed. With the exception of Egypt, Arab states
have made several claims regarding the Strait of Tiran. First, Israel has
been considered an enemy since 1948, and since there is no innocent pas-
sage in time of war, the strait could be blockaded. "By the same token,
Israel had an even clearer right to use force to resist Egypt's closure of
the Gulf in 1967 than it had in November 1956, when the legal regime of
the Egypt-Israel Armistice Agreement was still officially in force. "233
However, there is no foundation now for the assertion that a state of war
has existed since 1948. The 1979 Treaty of Peace abrogates the claim
that no peace treaty exists to terminate the state of war. In addition, the
United Nations Charter "forbids resort to war, [and] member states may
not declare or maintain a state of war between each other, and therefore
cannot claim special rights deriving from a pretense of belligerency, par-
ticularly not after the cessation of active hostilities. '2 34
A second claim made by the Arab states is that Israel is not a legiti-
mate riparian; however, for purposes of this article, and in light of world
consensus and the bilateral treaty discussed above, Israel is deemed a
legitimate riparian of the Gulf of Aqaba.235
A third claim for Arab states' control of the Strait of Tiran and Gulf
of Aqaba deals with the juridical status of the Gulf. This claim is two-
fold: that the Gulf is (1) an internal or closed sea or (2) an historic bay.
In customary international law, a closed sea is one in which there is only
a single riparian, or if several riparians, all states agree that the juridical
status of their territorial waters is "closed." The Gulf of Aqaba has four
sovereign states surrounding it. "Certainly the Gulf of Aqaba could be
transformed into a closed sea by agreement among all the littoral states
and recognition by other nations. '236 However, it is necessary for Israel
to maintain the Strait of Tiran as an international strait in order to retain
access to the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. It would not consider turn-
establish specific coastal state protection "through a detailed regulation of the duties of passing ships
and aircraft," based on arts. 34-44 of the 1982 Convention. Id. at 554.
232 Anthony, The Persian Gulf in Regional and International Politics: The Arab Side of the
Gulf, THE SECURITY OF THE PERSIAN GULF 170, 196 (1981) (by endorsing the treaty, Oman hoped
to gain favor with the United States and to substitute Iranian troops with Egyptian, to help with
Oman's Dhofar rebellion).
233 KHADDURI & DIXON, supra note 195 at 86.
234 R. LAPIDOTH, supra note 171, at 62.
235 Since the subject of this article concerns straits in the Middle East, political issues such as
the legitimacy of the State of Israel will not be discussed.
236 Gross, supra note 3, at 570. Professor Gross agrees with the view that the Gulf of Aqaba is
not a closed sea. Contra, Selak, supra note 207, at 693.
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ing the Gulf into a closed sea. Again, the Arab states argue that Israel
should be excluded as a legal littoral state since its territory was acquired
by war.
The claim that the Gulf of Aqaba is an historic bay is based in part
on the Gulf of Fonesca Case, decided by the Central American Court of
Justice on March 9, 1917.237 In this case, the Court decided that the
Gulf of Fonesca had the legal status of an historic bay and "the three
riparian States of El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua are, therefore,
recognized as co-owners of its waters .. "238 The Court's decision was
based on the premise that these states had immemorial possession of the
Gulf and peaceful, continuous, and total authority (animus domini)
which was accepted by all other nations. The situation surrounding the
Gulf of Aqaba is not, however, analogous.
The criterion for immemorial possession was set forth by the Arab
states to support the claim that the Gulf of Aqaba was the historic route
to Mecca; however, this claim was not proposed until 1957, by Saudi
Arabia.23 9 Further, the remaining criteria set forth by the Court in the
Gulf of Fonesca Case cannot be met because the Arab littoral states of the
Gulf of Aqaba have not maintained peaceful and continuous total con-
trol. In fact, scholars generally agree that the Gulf of Aqaba is not an
historic bay.2" Professor Gross suggests that the First Conference on
the Law of the Sea "may be deemed to have implicitly rejected" this
claim when it adopted art. 16(4) of the Convention, "which has been
generally regarded as fitting that particular gulf."'2 41 "By prohibiting
suspension of innocent passage through straits, the Conference rejected
decisively the competence of the coastal state 'to control the Strait as a
means of projecting its influence for purposes of special national policy,
not necessarily reflecting common interest.' "242
Although a peace treaty has been concluded between Egypt and
Israel, the claims discussed above cannot be disregarded since neither of
the riparian states of Jordan and Saudi Arabia is a party to the 1979
237 The Republic of El Salvador v. The Republic of Nicaragua, Central Am. Court of Justice
(1917), trans. and reprinted in, Judicial Decisions Involving Questions of International Law, 11 AM. J.
INT'L L. 674 (1917).
238 Id. at 716.
239 See R. LAPIDOTH, supra note 171, at 58. See also U.N. Doc. A/3575 (1957) (Saudi Ara-
bia's registered claim of Apr. 12, 1957).
240 See Y. BLUM, HISTORIC TITLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1965); L. BOUCHEZ, THE RE-
GIME OF BAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1964); R. LAPIDOTH, supra note 171; and Gross, supra
note 3. But see, E. RABBATH, MER ROUGE ET GOLFE D'AQABA DANS L'EvOLUTION DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL (1962) (theory of historic waters is inherent in the law of Islamic peoples who
govern the Red Sea and Gulf); see also, Murti, Editorial Comment, The Legal Status of the Gulf of
Aqaba, 7 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 201 (1967).
241 Gross, supra note 3, at 572.
242 Gross, Strait of Tiran. supra note 213, at 142.
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Treaty of Peace, nor are they signatories to either the 1958 or 1982 Con-
ventions on the Law of the Sea. In fact, one reason for their not signing
either Convention is the inclusion of the regime of nonsuspendable inno-
cent passage through international straits which connect high seas to ter-
ritorial seas.243
Egypt is a party to the 1982 Convention. While Israel is not, it is in
part due to that country's protest at giving observer status at the Third
Conference to national liberation movements (such as the Palestine Lib-
eration Organization). 2' However, in the 1979 Treaty of Peace both
Egypt and Israel expressly agreed to a regime in the Strait of Tiran which
is analogous to the transit passage regime of the 1982 Convention. The
bilateral peace treaty expressly supports both the First and Third Confer-
ences on the Law of the Sea. Further, when Egypt ratified the 1982 Con-
vention on August 26, 1983, it set forth a declaration concerning passage
through the Strait of Tiran which stated specifically that "[t]he provi-
sions of the 1979 Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel concerning pas-
sage through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba come within the
framework of the general regime of waters forming straits referred to in
part III of the [1982] Convention. 24 5
Since the United States was inextricably involved in arranging the
1979 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, it naturally supports the
international status of the Strait of Tiran, including nondiscrimination in
treatment of all ships and aircraft as well as unimpeded passage. As long
as the United States maintains its present friendly relations with all of the
states on the Gulf of Aqaba, passage through the Strait of Tiran will not
present a problem. However, as was stated previously, politics change
rapidly in the Middle East and what once appeared improbable may
quickly become a reality. Nevertheless, the economic and military sup-
port of all four states should assure the United States security in this
area.
246
243 1958 Convention, art. 16, para. 4; 1982 Convention, art. 45, para. 2.
244 Third U.N. Conference on the Law on the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/L. 129, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 62/L. 132/Add. 1, and U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/L. 138 (1982).
245 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, Declarations and Reservations -
Egypt, in MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (Supp. Actions
from 1 Jan.-31 Dec. 1983) XX1.6, XX1.6-1, XXI.6-3, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/2/Add.1 (1982).
246 See Statement by Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs,
Constable, U.S. Policy Toward the Middle East and Persian Gulf Region, 81 DEP'T ST. BULL. 43, 45
(June 1981) (specific amounts of assistance the U.S. planned to contribute in fiscal year 1982 to
Israel, Egypt and Jordan). For U.S. assistance to Saudi Arabia, see Twinam, supra note 96, at 63-66.
This writer conjectures that aid to Saudi Arabia has increased greatly since 1981, based on the
improved relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.
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V. CONCLUSION
Linkage between straits is an important concept in the Middle East.
Policies which apply to tankers leaving the Strait of Hormuz for the Red
Sea or the Gulf of Aqaba will have an impact on all of the straits along
the route. If passage is hampered, particularly in the Straits of Bab el
Mandeb or Hormuz, the "choke" would be felt throughout the world. In
fact, "any imposition by littoral states of restrictions on straits is apt to
be. . . an important and . . . (not) easily surmounted obstacle to naval
mobility. . . and to the shipping of oil and other resources. "247
The view that coastal states would restrict passage through straits,
ignores the economic and political costs to the states of closing straits
and the dependence of straits states upon international trade and com-
merce. Just as maritime states derive locational utility from the use of
straits, states bordering straits derive economic benefits from their po-
sition astride important trade corridors. In many cases, straits states
are more dependent upon unimpeded, low-priced transit than the ma-
jor maritime powers, especially where exports are the major source of
national income. To this degree, for example, Iran has as much at
stake in keeping the Strait of Hormuz open as the United States.
248
In all three Middle East straits a transit passage regime is vital to the free
flow of traffic. Although it has been claimed that transit passage is a new
regime, the United States claims it is customary international law. Un-
fortunately, regarding revolutionary activities, terrorists who intend to
impede the free flow of navigation through straits will do so in any case,
no matter what regime of the seas applies or what national laws or regu-
lations exist. The mining of the Red Sea in the summer of 1984 is just
such an example.
Regarding the Strait of Tiran, "[t]he majority of [Middle East
states] . . . insist[ed] that the regime of straits [in the 1982 Convention]
should be strictly confined to straits which connect two parts of the high
seas." 24 9 This would have excluded the Strait of Tiran from having inter-
national strait status. However, the rest of the world community consid-
ered this strait as an international strait in which the regime of
nonsuspendable innocent passage applied.2
Maritime states whose vessels transit the Strait of Tiran have a legal
right as well as an economic interest in maintaining umimpeded freedom
of navigation in the strait. Further, the 1979 Treaty of Peace between
247 A. HOLLICK & B. OSGOOD, supra note 203, at 115.
248 Pirtle, Transit Rights and U.S. Security Interests in International Straits: The "Straits De-
bate"Revisited, 5 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 477, 489 (1978). See R. ECKERT, supra note 7, at 74-75.
249 A. EL-HAKIM, supra note 11, at 78.
250 This is confirmed through the usage of states, pursuant to customary international law, and
to arts. 16(4) and 45(2) of the 1958 and 1982 Conventions on the Law of the Sea, respectively.
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Egypt and Israel changes the regime of innocent passage in the Strait of
Tiran, at least as to parties to the Treaty. By sanctioning a transit pas-
sage regime, the parties to the Treaty are aiding the evolution of custom-
ary international law in this strait. Since unimpeded passage has existed
since 1973, it is possible that the transit passage regime will emerge as the
rule of law in the Strait of Tiran for all states. Meanwhile, as a practical
matter, freedom of navigation exists in the Strait of Tiran due to Egypt's
pledge to maintain the strait as an international waterway for freedom of
navigation and overflight.
As to the Straits of Hormuz and Bab el Mandeb, maritime and
coastal states look with strict scrutiny at the political instability sur-
rounding these waters. It is of utmost importance to all states, both litto-
ral and nonlittoral, that freedom of passage be unimpeded in these
straits. The United States position is that existing customary interna-
tional law in the Straits of Hormuz and Bab el Mandeb is that of unim-
peded passage in, over and under the straits. Since transit passage does
not depend on the width of straits, the United States maintains that part
III of the 1982 Convention merely codifies the existing law as the regime
of transit passage. For over twenty-five years, freedom of navigation and
overflight have existed in these straits, with only one interruption in
1973.25!
Although the United States is not a party to the 1982 Convention,
its ships will be accorded the same deference as the ships of states which
are parties because dependence on the trade, commodities, and military
power of the United States is significant. "To say that the United States
or other maritime nations must subscribe to an unacceptable arrange-
ment concerning deep seabed exploitation in order to retain a right to
continued exercise of existing navigational freedoms is to turn interna-
tional law on its head. '25 2 As to military security,
[c]laims that a right of innocent passage through straits would pose a
serious threat to United States security are blatantly overstated: the
sea-based deterrent is not dependent on unimpeded passage through
straits, and the mission of force projection and presence can be con-
ducted with limited constraints under a regime of innocent passage.253
In 1986, United States policy depends upon a close relationship with
Saudi Arabia and Egypt. By 1987, this policy might be dependent upon
other Middle Eastern states. In any event, the United States will con-
251 Osgood, supra note 71.
252 Harlow, supra note 58, at 9.
253 Pirtle, supra note 248, at 493. See also, Osgood, United States Security Interests in Ocean
Law, 2 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 1, 36 (1964). Osgood explains that Trident class submarines with
"ultra-long range missiles of 4,000 to 6.000 miles, make submarine mobility through straits less
important." Id.
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tinue to provide economic and military assistance to promote stability in
the Middle East. Approximately fifty percent of the United States
"global economic assistance is directed to the Middle East. . . . The
West remains dependent upon petroleum supplies from . .. [Middle
East] producers, while they have acquired an important stake in access to
western technology and capital markets."2 ' Again, both maritime and
coastal states have a decided interest in maintaining unimpeded passage
through the straits.
The regimes of transit passage and nonsuspendable innocent passage
through straits allow for the unimpeded movement of vessels. Naturally,
laws are useful to states only as long as they are effective. As to the three
straits in the Middle East, the laws and regulations concerning the free
flow of commodities and ships are vital. The straits in the Middle East
are of such importance to the world's economic order that freedom of
passage should undoubtedly be ensured in this troubled area, regardless
of whether or not a state is a party to the 1982 Convention on the Law of
the Sea. If a strangling blockade against oil shipments occurred in the
Middle East straits, "a law of the sea treaty would be irrelevant."2 5 Fur-
ther, Iran and Iraq have been at war for over five years and the Strait of
Hormuz has not yet been closed to traffic. "Problems concerning straits
are global - for passage through straits affects not only user and straits
states but also other states, which may directly or indirectly be affected
from the strategic viewpoint - political, military or economic. "256 It is
hoped, therefore, that these mutual interests together will help to main-
tain open straits in the Middle East.
254 Constable, supra note 246, at 44.
255 Osgood, supra note 71, at 28.
256 K. KOH, supra note 88, at 3.
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APPENDIX
Middle East Coastal States - Territorial sea limits and dates established
and whether or not signatories to the 1982 Convention. From: VI New




claimed (all Party to 1982
references are to Convention, as
nautical miles) of May 1984
Gulf of Aqaba
Egypt 12 (1958) Yes
Israel 6 (1956) No
Jordan 3 (1943) No
Saudi Arabia 12 (1958) No
Red Sea
Egypt 12 (1958) Yes
Ethiopia 12 (1953) Yes
Saudi Arabia 12 (1958) No
Somalia 200 (1972) Yes
*Sudan 12 (1960) Yes
YAR 12 (1967) Yes
*PDRY 12 (1970) Yes
*Djibouti 12 (1971) Yes
Persian Gulf
Bahrain 3 (n.d.) Yes
Iran 12 (1959) Yes
Iraq 12 (1958) Yes
Kuwait 12 (1967) Yes
Oman 12 (1972) Yes
Qatar 3 (n.d.) No
Saudi Arabia 12 (1958) No
United Arab Emirates 3 Yes
(Sharjah) (12) (1970)
*Sudan, PDRY and Djibouti are given dates different from the ones cited
above for their territorial sea limit proclamations, in R. Lapidoth-
Eschelbacher, The Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden 199, 209, 217, respectively
(1982). The dates cited by Professor Lapidoth-Eschelbacher are: 1970 Sudan,
1977 PDRY, and 1978 Djibouti.
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